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Abstract
The end of the Cold created an optimistic atmosphere in Europe. It was expected that
the new era would create more security and stability in Europe. But this optimism
has not lasted for a long time because of the second Gulf War, the turmoil in Algeria
and the crisis in the Balkans. The challenges were stemming from the south, rather
than the east and central Europe and they were hard and soft security issues with an
emphasis on the later. Western institutions –EU, NATO and OSCE- started
initiatives to tackle with these problems. EU, because of its comprehensive approach
to security, is the key player. The other institutions can complement the EU’s
initiative to some extent. All the attempts are highly vulnerable to the developments
in the Middle East Peace Process.
iv
Özet
Soğuk savaşın sona ermesi Avrupa’da iyimser bir hava yarattı. Yeni dönemin daha
istikrarlı ve güvenli olacağı sanılıyordu. Ancak körfez krizi, Cezayir olayları ve
Balkanlar’da yaşanan gelişmeler, bu iyimserlik havasının fazla sürmesini engelledi.
Yeni dönemde tehditler Orta ve Doğu Avrupa’dan değil, güneyden bekleniyor.
Sadece askeri tedbirlerle bu tehditleri engellemek mümkün değil, çünkü bir çok
problemin özünde ekonomik ve sosyal sebepler yatıyor. AB, NATO ve AGİT bu
sorunlarla ilgilenmek için girişimlerde bulundu. Bunlar içerisinde sadece AB
sourunlara cevap verebilecek yeteneğe sahip. Ancak, kendi içerisindeki görüş
ayrılıkları, kararsızlığı ve ekonomik olarak yük almak istememesi sorunlarda etkili
olmasını engelliyor. NATO ve AGİT ancak tamamlayıcı bir rol oynayabilir. Bütün
girişimler Ortadoğu Barış sürecindeki gelişmlere endeksli.
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1INTRODUCTION
          This thesis is an assessment of the security challenges and institutional
initiatives in the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean security perceptions
comprise an uneven set of military (hard security issues) and non-military (soft
security issues) challenges with emphasis on the latter.1 The Mediterranean is a
region where the West has a number of vital interests. Its main concerns extend to
energy security (with a focus on North Africa and the Persian Gulf and in the near
future the Caspian basin), regional stability, the containment of religious extremism
and the prevention of mass migration.2
          To tackle with these challenges Western Institutions (NATO, EU, and OSCE)
started initiatives towards the region. Because of the root causes of the challenges the
EU has the best instruments to deal with them. However lack of political will and
lack of cohesion among the member states prevent significant development. The
other two institutions don’t have the necessary means. Hence their contribution to the
regional stability will be limited.
          All the initiatives are highly vulnerable to the Middle East Peace Process. The
1991 Madrid Agreement and the 1993 Oslo Accords paved the way for cooperation.
Until now none of the initiatives has affected the peace process positively, but they
have been influenced by the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The election
of a right-wing party member, Benjamin Netanyahu, as a prime minister after the
assassination of Yithzak Rabin in 1995 seriously harmed all attempts. And now, the
                                                          
1 Roberto Aliboni,  “European Union Security Perceptions and Policies Towards the Mediterranean”,
Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium, ed. by Stephen J. Blank, US: Strategic Studies
Institute, 1999, p.125.
2second Intifada has stagnated progress made so far. Without a real solution of the
problem a significant progress is not expected in these initiatives.
          In this thesis the Arab-Israeli conflict will be dealt with to the extent in which
it influences the initiatives. Because none of the attempts aim to solve the conflict.
Even Israel, although it is geographically located in the south, is not considered a
“southern” country because of its strong economy and huge military power. Also the
Turkish-Greek dispute will be excluded, because it is not the main focus of the
initiatives and both countries are NATO and OSCE member states, Greece is an EU
member and Turkey is an EU candidate country.
          Chapter 1 is about the security challenges in the Mediterranean region. During
the Cold War the Soviet threat was the main security concern for the western
analysts. Hence the definition of security was limited to external, military threats to
states. The main focus was the East and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean
region was ignored by the institutions.
          With the end of the Cold War the Soviet threat diminished and as a result of
this a more secure Europe was expected by the western policy makers.  But the Gulf
Crisis, the Algerian Case and the events in the Balkans proved this expectation
wrong. The real threat to European security was not coming from the northern
region, but from the south. The new threats were economic and social problems, in
addition to the proliferation weapons of mass destruction (WMP) and their means of
delivery and the arms race of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern
countries. Hence, the traditional definition of security was insufficient. Security
considerations should include economic, demographic, societal, cultural,
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Thanos P. Dokos, “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean: The
Threat to Western Security,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol:5, No:3, Autumn 2000, p.95.
3environmental, etc. issues. Indeed, hard and soft security issues are interdependent
and transnational.
          At the moment none of the southern countries is able to conduct any direct
military threat to the north, either by conventional or unconventional means.
However, some of them have necessary means to affect western interests.
         The deteriorating economies, the high rate of population growth, the increasing
unemployment rate are the main challenges. Because they cause migration to Europe
and strengthen fundamentalists at home which brings about other problems with
regional implications. Environmental problems and scarcity of sources are also
considered seriously.
          Chapter 2 provides an assessment of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue that
started in 1995. It is a part of NATO’s comprehensive approach to security. It
consists of political dialogue and participation in specific activities. NATO does not
have a good image in the south, it is perceived as a US led military organization
which is looking for new challenges after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Even the
new missions of NATO create doubts in the south. By this dialogue, NATO aims to
lessen the misperceptions of the south and to explain its new missions, and to
contribute to confidence building in the region. The dialogue is highly vulnerable to
the peace process. Hence its contribution to confidence building will be limited
          NATO doesn’t have the necessary means to deal with the root causes of the
instability in the region: it is a purely military organization without significant
financial instruments.  The southern states see NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue as a
mean to increase economic relations with the rich northern states.
          Chapter 3 is about the EU’s Barcelona process, in other terms the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. The foreign ministers of the fifteen member states of the
4EU and of the twelve invited Mediterranean non-EU community countries gathered
in Barcelona and started this process in 1995. The Barcelona declaration issued at the
end of the conference declared that the objective was to turn the Mediterranean basin
into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace and stability
and prosperity. The need to respect various principles such as human rights,
democracy, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other states and
the peaceful settlement of disputes was emphasized. Along the lines of the CSCE, the
participants agreed to concentrate their future cooperation in three broad areas or
“chapters” namely, politics and security; economics and finance; and social, cultural
and human relations.3 Its peculiarity lies in its comprehensive approach to the
problem.
          The Barcelona Process is the most ambitious and developed of the institutional
Mediterranean initiatives.  The initiative responded to a perceived need, particularly
among the countries in Southern Europe, to address the growing social and economic
problems on the non-European side of the Mediterranean littoral. Its main aim is to
provide long term stability through economic development. The second chapter of
the Barcelona Declaration, which focused on economic and financial partnership,
refereed to the aim of creating a free trade zone in the Euro-Mediterranean area by
the year 2010. It is argued that this free trade zone can reduce the economic gap
between the north and the south of the Mediterranean. Economic development is
expected to provide positive political and social effects that can bring about more
stability and security in the region.
          However, in spite of its ambitious goal progress has been modest. Lack of
cohesion among the member states, in particular between the northern and southern
                                                          
3 Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 28 November 1995,
Barcelona, 1995.
5European countries and lack of political will are the main reasons for the slow
progress. The process continued despite the fluctuations in the Middle East Peace
Process. However, without a solid peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict a significant
development is not expected.
          Chapter 4 is about the Mediterranean Dimension of the OSCE. It provides a
short review of the Helsinki Process and its contribution to the end of the Cold War,
and in the following parts it includes an assessment of the Mediterranean policy of
the OSCE. The OSCE traditionally follows a comprehensive approach to security.
But it doesn’t have the necessary financial means to deal with the region’s problems
and its priority lies elsewhere.
           The traditional military confidence building measures which were some of the
instruments that paved the way for the end of the Cold War are not applicable to the
Mediterranean region. During the Cold War there was a military balance between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both blocks were in agreement on the status quo of the
borders and there was no military conflict among the western Europeans. None of
these elements exist in the Mediterranean region. There is a big military gap between
the northern countries, not to mention Israel, and the southern Mediterranean states,
the Arab-Israeli conflict continues and there isn’t a minimum degree of trust among
the southern littoral states. A comprehensive approach, with an emphasis on
economic issues can be more effective for confidence building, and security and
stability in the region. However, unless the Arab-Israeli conflict is solved its success
will be limited.
6CHAPTER 1: Security Challenges in the Mediterranean
          Since the Mediterranean region links three continents (Europe, Asia and
Africa) and represents a very important land, see and air crossroad, it has been
strategically important for European and world Security from the ancient past up to
the present.4
          During the Cold War Mediterranean security issues were defined largely as a
function of the Soviet threat.5 The attention of Western policymakers was primarily
focused on the Central Front. The Mediterranean was regarded as secondary of
importance.6 It had been considered Europe’s strategic backwater.7 Beyond the
competition with the Soviet Union, the security environment in the South was
relatively benign.8  The Arab-Israeli and Greek-Turkish frictions were dangerous
regional problems, but unlikely to pose a direct threat to Western Europe.9 A direct
threat from the South did exist only in the form of terrorism and Gadhafi’s Libya.10
Almost all the security considerations were in military nature, in other words most of
them were hard security issues.
          The lifting of the iron curtain fundamentally changed the nature of European
and even world politics. The demise created an atmosphere for cooperation and
                                                          
4 Anton Grizod, “The Challenges of the Central and Eastern European and the Mediterranean Region
for Creating a new European Security Order,” paper presented at the Halki International Seminars,
Greece, 7-14 September 1996, p. 8.
5 Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stepheen Larabee, Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security: New Challenges,
new tasks,” NATO Review, No:3, May 1996, p.28.
6 F. Stepheen Larabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser and Miche Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean
Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-957-IMD, 1998, p.1.
7 Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stepheen Larabee, Ian O. Lesser, op.cit. note 3, p.25.
8 Ian O. Lesser, NATO Looks South: New Challenges and new Strategies in the Mediterranean, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1126-AF, 2000, p.6.
9 Ibid., p.7.
7partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia,
Ukraine and other countries formerly part of the Soviet Union. So, much of the
efforts over the past decade were concentrated on projecting western values in
Eastern and Central European states. Despite the difficulties of the transition process
to democracy and market economy of these states, a general mood of optimism was
achieved there, particularly in security terms.11
          The Gulf War and the Algerian case showed that the picture in the South was
not as bright as that of the Eastern Europe. Also the turmoil in the Balkans darkened
the picture. The increasing energy dependency of the European countries to the
region was another dimension of the issue. Although it was frequently stressed that -
as in the final communique of NATO’s April 1999 Washington Summit- security of
the whole the Europe is closely linked to the security and stability in the
Mediterranean, the issues related to the region remained essentially at the margins of
European Security and NATO concerns, much as they had throughout the Cold
War.12
          There are wide a range of security challenges  - from the case of weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) to air pollution- stemming from the Mediterranean region,
and most of them are transnational in character that threaten different areas
irrespective of borders and distances.13 Traditionally, studies on security focused on
military and defence issues, such as arms control, terrorism, and the proliferation of
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Gareth Winrow, Dialogue with the Mediterranean: the Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative,
New York, Garland, 2000, p. 62.
11 Javier Solana, “ NATO and the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads, ed. by
Nikolas A. Stavrou, U.S. , Duke University press, 1999, p.36.
12 F. Stepheen Larabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser and Miche Zanini, The Future of NATO’s
Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps, Santa Monica, CA. RAND, MR – 1164-SM,
2000, p.1.
13 Alessandro Politi, Transnational Security Challenges in the Mediterranean,” in Mediterranean
Security into the Coming Millennium, ed. by Stephen J. Blank, U.S., Strategic Studies Institute, 1999,
p.35.
8WMD. These are often referred to as hard security issues.14 This type of definition
reflects the security considerations in the Cold War era, which was primarily
concerned with maintaining stability and status quo and countering possible external
threat.15
          At present, the traditional definition of security in military terms is
inadequate.16 Advocates of new thinking on security in the post- Cold War era
emphasize that the focus of attention should no longer be on only external, military
threats to states. They argue, rather, that there is now a need to also include potential
threats stemming from other areas – economic, environmental, societal etc – that are
referred to as areas of soft security.17 Soft security issues are factors that can lead to
domestic instability, which could then spill across borders and create regional
tensions and even conflicts.18
          Buzan has identified five security sectors: military, political, economic,
societal, and environmental.19 Political security concerns are “the organisational
stability of states, systems of government and, the ideologies that give them
legitimacy.” Economic security concerns include“ access to resources, finance and
markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.” Societal
security concerns are involved with “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions,
for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and both religion and
national identity and custom.” Environmental security is concerned with  “the
                                                          
14 Winrow, op. cit. note 10,  p.24.
15 Ibid.
16 Thanos Dokos, “Developing Dialogue between WEU and the Mediterranean Countries: Some
Proposals,” Istituto Affari International, 1998, p.1.
17 Winrow, op.cit. note 10, p.24.
18 Judith S. Yaphe, “Do No Harm: Thoughts on NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative,” Mediterranean
Quarterly, Vol:10, No:4, Fall 1996, p. 56
19  Bary Buzan, People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-
Cold War Area, London: Harevester Wheatscheaf, 1991, introduction cited in “European Union’s
Mediterranean Security Policy: An Assessment,” paper presented by Yiannis A. Stivachtis at the 16th
9maintenance of the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all
other human enterprises depend.”20 All these sectors are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing. Thus changes in one sector may positively or negatively affect other
sectors.21 In other words security is a multi-dimensional concept.
          The transnational and multi-dimensional character of the security challenges in
the South signal that even a slightest challenge can cause trouble in the North. What
are these challenges? To what extent are they considered seriously? What are the
priorities of the North with regard to the security challenges?
1.1. Military Challenges stemming from the South
          Though it is widely recognised in Europe that there are no military threats
directed from the region, there are a number of factors that represent potential to
security and are likely to have defence and military implications.22 In 1990 the ratio
of military expenditure to the gross domestic product GDP of the Arab World was
9.9 percent, in contrast to 4.3 percent in other developing countries, and 5 percent for
the entire World.23 The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region is the largest
arms importing region in the world as final destination of 39.5 percent of all arms
import.24 Just considering the percentage is sufficient to show that the region cannot
be ignored.
                                                                                                                                                                    
Annual Graduate Student Conference: ‘The Changing Face of Europe’ at the Institute on Western
Europe, Columbia University, March 25-27, 1999, p.5.
20 Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible,” New Thinking about Strategy and International
Security ed. by Ken Both, London:Harper Collins Academic, 1991, p.35 cited in Winrow op. cit. note
10, p.24-25
21 Stivachtis, op. cit. note 19, p.5.
22 Fernanda Faria, “The Making of Portugal’s Mediterranean Policy,” in The Foreign Policies of the
European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990’s, ed by Stelios
Stavrrids, Theodore Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis, Neville Waites, London, Macmillan, 1999, p.127.
23 Flippos  Pierros, Jacob Meunier, Stan Abrams, Bridges and Barriers: The European Union’s
Mediterranean Policy , 1961-1999, Great Britain, Ashgate, 1999, p.28.
24 The Military Balance 1997/98, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oxford
University Press, 1997, p.265.
10
          In terms of military security, the interest of the northern states is twofold: First,
they wish to prevent the rise of direct military threats against them coming from the
southern states and, if such threats exist, to find ways to peacefully deal with them.
Second, they need to prevent the outbreak of a violent conflict among the southern
states that would have important economic, political, social consequences for the
North.25
1.1.1. Ceuta and Melilla
          In fact, at the moment no direct military threat is expected from the Southern
states, in spite of the dispute between Spain and Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla.
Ceuta and Melilla are small Spanish enclaves on the Moroccon coast. The two
enclaves have been in Spanish hands since the late 15th century (before they had been
Portuguese) and are treated as integral parts of the national territory under Spain’s
1978 constitution. Ceuta is home over 73.000 Spanish nationals; Mellila to over
63.000 Spanish nationals.26 The status of these territories still remains an open
question, a “window for vulnerability” for Spain.27 Because, on the one hand the
Moroccans, especially the nationalist and Islamist circles, have claims with respect to
the enclaves, on the other hand the Spanish government insists that the territories are
not a matter of discussion and will be defended by force if necessary. Nonetheless it
remains an open question whether any Spanish government would resort to force to
                                                          
25 Stivachtis, op.cit.21, pp.5-6.
26 Carlos Echeverria Jesus, “Spain and the Mediterranean,” in The Foreign Policies of the European
Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990’s, p.110.
27 Carlo Collatto, “The Decalogue of Spanish Security Policy,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol:2, No:
4, Fall 1991, p.67
11
assert Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves in the event of large numbers of
Moroccons simply entered Ceuta and Mellila and refusing to leave.28
          At the moment Spain prefers to solve the problem peacefully, hence it aims to
increase its relations with Morocco in a variety of fields, including military and
defence issues. This policy has been welcomed by the Moroccons, because for them
the Western Sahara is the top priority security issue and most of the Moroccan
Forces are concentrated on the Western Sahara. But, after a permanent solution to the
Western Sahara problem, most probably Morocco will heed to the
enclaves.29Naturally any redeployment of forces to the north would inevitably
provoke concern in defence circles in Spain. A military crisis over the enclaves,
between a NATO-EU member state and a North
African Muslim populated country, would pose the risk of rapid escalation with
serious repercussions for the whole region.30
1.1.2. Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery
          For the western allies and European governments the main concern is the risk
that the non-conventional armaments will proliferate in the region in the middle
term.31 The proliferation of WMD including the means for their delivery at longer
ranges has emerged as a leading issue on the post-Cold War security agenda. The
experience of the Gulf war, including the discovery of a substantial Iraqi nuclear
program, the threat of chemical and biological weapons and the use of Scud missiles,
brought the proliferation issue to the forefront as well as expert attention. Nowhere
                                                          
28 Ian O. Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges, Santa Monica,
CA:RAND, MR-203-AF, 1994, p.29.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p.30.
31 Roberto Aliboni, “Collective Political Cooperation in the Mediterranean,” and Jed C. Snyder,
“Arms and Security in the Mediterranean,” in Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region, ed.
by Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe and Tim Niblock, London, Frank Cass, 1996.
12
has the prospect of the spread of WMD had a more pronounced effect on strategic
perceptions than around the Mediterranean.32 As a French observer has noted “A
proper regard for security can not exclude the hypothesis that several European cities
will be - properly sooner than generally expected- the potential targets of these
weapons.”33
          Islamism with its determined anti-western attitude and a possible pan-Arab
nationalism make the situation nastier. The undemocratic character of the regimes in
the South is another nuisance. Because it is widely believed in that the authoritarian
regimes are adventurous and perceive no domestic constraints on the ability to go to
war and they are more likely to use WMD if they are at their disposal.34
          In fact the Arab World is motivated by primarily by intra-regional concerns
rather than the North. Domestic structures of these states and the changes that the end
of the Cold War caused in the international system are also important factors for the
proliferation around the Mediterranean.
          During the Cold war the third World countries were able to exploit the East-
West tension by aligning East or West, or by following a non-alignment policy. They
were playing superpowers’ interests off against each other.  This was a considerable
leverage for them in the international arena. By this way they were able to get
financial and military aids from the superpowers and to assert their policies in the
international system. Alignment and non-alignment served as a potent source of
strategic weight for countries across the Middle East and North Africa. The risk of
superpower escalation made Moscow and Washington extraordinarily sensitive to the
                                                          
32 Ian O. Lesser, Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure Proliferation around the Mediterranean, Santa
Monica, Ca: RAND, 1997, pp. 1-2.
33 Pierre Lellouche, “France in Search for Security,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, p.124.
34 Mohhammed El Sayed Selim, “Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership: An Arab Perspective,” in The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean
Regional Community ed. by Alvaro Vasconceles and George Joffe, London, Frank Cass, 2000, p.145.
13
regional disputes and this provided to some extent stability for the region and for the
World.35
          The end of the Cold War has meant that the Mediterranean has lost certain
strategic advantages that it formerly possessed and that the countries on its southern
shore no longer have the means of manipulating East-West tension.36 They lost an
important leverage in the international system. The Russian security guarantee to its
clients in the region has disappeared, leaving countries such as Libya, Syria, Iraq and
Algeria without any form of external aid. Russia was not eager to and able to provide
financial and military aid anymore. Regional powers now must rely on indigenous
political and military power.37 The regional countries felt more vulnerable to their
neighbours and to a western intervention.
          The pursuit of WMD development has emerged as a leading vehicle for
prestige assertiveness, and attention in the post-Cold War world.38 For some of the
Arab countries in the region having nuclear capability –civilian or military- is a mean
for prestige in the regional and international context. They are also well aware of the
fact that even a fleeting evidence of the ability and interest in acquiring WMD
capabilities draws western attention.39  They want to be taken seriously and they see
the nuclear issue as mean for that goal. An Algerian analyst and former high ranking
diplomat’s words is an evidence for their aim: “In ten years time there will be two
countries in Africa which are taken seriously by the United States – South Africa and
Algeria – both will be nuclear powers.40 They also aim to blackmail the West. They
signal implicitly or explicitly: “Pay due attention to our regional security concerns /
                                                          
35 Lesser, op.cit. note 32, pp.5-6.
36 Abdelwahab Biad, “Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean: A Southern Viewpoint,” in
Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region, p.47.
37 Lesser, op.cit. note 32, p.5.
38 Ibid., p.7.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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development requirements / desire for strategic reassurance etc., or else.” Put another
way, “How much will you pay me not to go to nuclear?”41
          The internal environment in key countries in the region also contributes to
proliferation dynamics. The obsession with security, both internal and external, gives
the military and the associated industry establishments considerable weight. As a
result of this even in cases where governments are persuaded of the need to rein in
WMD for reasons of regional and international politics, military and industry
establishments may balk or argue for clandestine approaches.42 The previous
sentence should not be interpreted as if the governments in the region reject
acquisition of WMD completely. Most governments in the region are authoritarian
which are backed by the military and they can not solve the numerous domestic
problems. They lack legitimacy at home and the ruling elites’ positions are
questioned.  The WMD issue is a vehicle to distract the public from the domestic
problems and to win popular support and bolster the ruling elites’ position.
          But the regional factors are the leading motives in the proliferation dynamic.43
The borders of many countries surrounding the Mediterranean are artificial in nature,
reflecting more the whims of nineteenth century European cartographers than the
national aspirations of the native populations concerned. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the region has been an area of numerous conflicts since the end of the
colonial period.44
          The decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict is the most serious threat to stability in
the Mediterranean region.45  Israel, one of the partners of this dispute is an unofficial
nuclear country. It is estimated that Israel may have as many as 200 warheads
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consisting of aircraft bombs, missile warheads and non-strategic/battlefield types.46 It
possesses chemical weapons. It is also widely believed that it has biological
weapons.47 It signed but not ratified Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is not
party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It has a considerable ballistic
missile arsenal consisting of Jericho 1 (1200 km), Jericho 2 (1800 km) and Shavit
(7500km).48 It is also developing air defence system and has cruise missile programs
(200-400km).49 With its long-range delivery systems and satellite reconnaissance
assets, Israel is in a position to wage on non-conventional war, relatively immune
from counterattacks.50 While all the Euro- Mediterranean states (also Iran) are parties
to Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel refuses to sign the NPT. The relative narrowness
of its national territory, the constant hostility of some states in the region, the balance
which would be less favourable to Israel in conventional weapons, the proliferation
of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the region and the Iraqi case are factors
why Israel rejects to sign the treaty.51 Israel has no desire to give up its nuclear
capabilities, for they are seen  – because of their deterrent feature – as the ultimate
way of guaranteeing the existence of the Jewish state. Israel’s stand on the NPT
involves not signing it before having signed peace treaties with the Arab states. It
would then support the establishment of WMD free zone in the Middle East.52
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          On the other hand, Egypt inisits on begining the process of removing all forms
of WMD from the Middle East without necessarily waiting for the completion of the
peace process. It calls for the simultaneous elimination of all categories of WMD.53
          Egypt is not party to the CWC. It had employed chemical weapons as early as
the 1960s when involved in the Yemeni civil war. Most probably it has developed its
chemical-weapons capabilities over the following decades.54
          Chemical –and biological– weapons are relatively easy to manufacture and
stockpile, using low-level technology at low cost. They can be produced for civilian
purposes and transferred to military ones at short notice.55 They are an attractive and
cost effective alternative to a nuclear program. That is why they are preferred by
some of the third world countries, like Egypt. Egypt, similar to other Arab countries
links its accession to the CWC to Israel’s endorsement of the NPT and its de-
nuclearisation within a specified framework.56 Egypt signed but not ratified BWC.
There is no evidence of major organised research activity.57 It is a party to NPT and
there is no evidence of more than basic research since 1960s. However it is
sometimes argued that Egypt must have nuclear capabilities to reduce the risk of
future wars between Egypt and Israel. It is claimed that due to the nuclear deterrence
none of them would dare to go to war.58
          Egypt has a significant ballistic missile program. It has evidently redoubled its
efforts to develop ballistic missiles that may be tipped with chemical weapons.59
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Egyptian Scud-B missiles have been modified to extend their range from 280 km. to
450 km.  The Badr missile is also being developed, which could have a range of 850-
1000km.60
          Israel is not the only security concern for Egypt. Sudan is also a problem.
Egypt and Sudan were unable to reach an agreement over the strategically important
territory known as the Halaib Triangle by the Red Sea since Sudan’s independence.
The dispute over this area worsened in 1992 when Sudan granted a Canadian
company an oil concession. Egypt finally seized the area of land in 1995. This came
after Egypt accused the Sudanese of attempting to assassinate President Mubarak in
Addis Ababa in June 1995.61  Egypt also accuses the Sudan government, a strong
defender of Islamic ideology, of supporting extremists in Egypt.62 Control of the
water of the Nile is another dispute between the states.
          Libya, at present, is not a security concern for Egypt as it was in the past.
There is a political rapprochement between the two countries. The country’s isolation
and internal dissidence forced Libya to seek allies among his neighbours like Egypt.
At the same time Libya keeps alive its desire for WMD which cannot be ignored by
neighbour countries, also by Egypt. It is party to NPT and BWC but not to CWC. It
has sought to develop nuclear weapons. Gadhafi called for a Libyan production of
nuclear weapons on April 29, 1990. It continues to train nuclear scientists and
technicians abroad.  But there is no evidence of progress or success.63
          Libya is alleged to have an offensive biological weapon (BW) capability or in
process of seeking such a capability and it is also alleged to be acquiring chemical
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weapons.64 Chad has accused Libya of using chemical weapons in a war fought
between the two countries in 1986-1987.
          Libya also has a significant ballistic missile program. It has Scud-B missiles
with a range of 280-300km. and upgraded Scud-C missiles from North Korea with a
longer range of 500km. It was also apparently interested in procuring Chinese
missiles with a range of 600km. and 2000 km. away. It has also expressed an interest
in securing the North Korean Nodong 1 missile, which has a range of 1100-1300km.
This missile can carry a nuclear, chemical and biological warhead.65
          The unpredictable and anti-western (aimed in particular at the United States)
attitude of Gadhafi, his dislike of pro-western behaviour, his opposition to Israel and
the nationalist feelings in Libya make the situation uneasy, especially for Tunisia and
Algeria.
          Libya is the main security concern for Tunisia. In addition to the border
dispute, Libya is accused of training and supporting Tunisian Islamists, not in order
to promote Islamist ideology but with a view to undermining the internal stability of
Tunisia.66 Tunisia has only small military establishment. It is party to NPT, CWC
and BWC. Acquisition of WMD has never been and is still not a Tunisian defence
policy option. In case of a conflict it relies on the prospect of friendly intervention
from the U.S., Europe or elsewhere in the Maghreb.67
          Tunisia has been traditionally uneasy about Algerian intentions in the region.
Especially the turmoil made Algeria a leading source of risk for Tunisia due to the
infiltration of armed Algerian groups, support from Algeria to Tunisian Islamic
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fundamentalists and the possibility of extension of violence to its territory. Also the
WMD and ballistic missile programs under way in Algeria have begun to emerge as
a concern in political and military circles.68 Algeria is party to NPT and CWC, but
not to BWC.  It had some attempts to create a covert nuclear research program under
military control with Chinese support.69 On August 23,1998, a Spanish paper, El Pais
claimed that Spain’s military secret service, the CESID, had issued a report to the
government on July with respect to the Algerian Nuclear program. The report is said
to have emphasized that Algeria had forged ahead with a nuclear program with
Chinese and Argentine technical support that far exceeded its civilian needs, despite
having signed NPT and concluded that if the Algerian government decided to change
its current policy of not acquiring atomic weapons, “the knowledge gathered by a
significant number of technicians and scientists, in addition to the availability of
facilities… will place this country in the position of initiating a program of military
purposes.”70
          Algeria has some research activities with respect to chemical and biological
weapons. It is able to produce chemical weapons, but not biological weapons. At
present it has no intentions for such systems.71 Algeria has no ballistic missiles in
service or in R&D.72 But it may be intending to acquire Scud-C and North Korean
Nodong-1 missiles.73
          At present Algeria has concentrated on its domestic problems. The Western
circles and Algeria’s neighbours concern about a possible Islamic take over in
Algeria as well as the current situation. Because such a revolution might have severe
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implications for the region and for the West. Morocco is the country for which
Algeria is the main security concern, particularly, due to the Western Sahara conflict.
          In 1975 Morocco peacefully occupied the Spanish Sahara and Spain withdrew
from the region. Morocco and Mauritania agreed on the division of the region. In
response, the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquio El Hamra
and Rio de Oro) mounted an active insurgency aimed at the establishment of an
Independent Sahrawi state.74  The Polisario Front was actively backed by Algeria.
Algeria also diplomatically recognised the so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic as the ruling authority over the Western Sahara. Moroccan officials suspect
that Algeria is seeking an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean via the Western Sahara. In
recent years, due to its internal problems Algeria has scaled down its support for
Polisario Front. Today, the UN struggles for a peaceful solution, if it fails, the
Western Sahara could become a scene of a major confrontation between Morocco
and Algeria, if and when the civil unrest in Algeria is eventually brought under
control.75
          Moroccan Armed Forces are the largest in the Maghreb and the most
professional and efficient. Morocco is party to the NPT and the CWC and signed but
not ratified BWC. It has no interest and intention for WMD and ballistic missiles.
Most of its equipment is western origin and superior that of Algeria’s.
          Mauritania is not at ease with the great size of the Moroccon Armed Forces.
Especially it worries about Morocco’s claims to the port of Gouera and the security
of the rail connection between Zouriat –an important center for iron mining in
Mauritania- and the Atlantic Ocean. But due to Morocco’s superiority it is highly
unlikely that a military engagement will happen between them. Mauritania’s army is
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the weakest in the region, in terms of both equipment and manpower. Mauritania is
party to NPT and CWC, but not to BWC.
          In the Levant Syria is the most enthusiastic state for WMD and their delivery
means. It is party to NPT, but not CWC. It signed but not ratified BWC. For Syria
peace is a prerequisite for arms control negotiations in the region.76 In addition to its
dispute with Israel, it has also problems with Turkey, over water and territorial
issues.
          Syria has ongoing research efforts for nuclear weapons, but there is no
evidence of major progress. However it is highly probable that Syria is developing an
offensive biological capability.77 Chemical weapons are the most important
component of its unconventional program. It is suggested that Syria operates two or
three facilities for producing chemicals.78 It has Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. It is
also known to be interested in even larger range (1000km.) missiles.79
          It would not be wise to ignore Iraq and Iran in the region while considering the
proliferation issue. Iraq’s extensive WMD ambitions have been frozen as a result of
the Gulf defeat. Presumably it will not be able to equip itself with this type of
capability in the medium term.80 But over the longer term, and in the absence of
international sanctions, it would almost certainly seek to rebuild its WMD capacity.81
          Iran has a very powerful desire for acquiring WMD and the means for their
delivery at longer ranges. Maybe it is the best example in the region that has all the
third world country reasons for acquiring WMD and their delivery means. Its search
for strategic weight, assertiveness and prestige in the region and in the international
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arena, its domestic problems, the regime, its conflict with Israel etc. are the main
reasons behind its motive.
          Iran is party to NPT, CWC and BWC. In spite of that it has been frequently
suspected of wishing to acquire nuclear weapons. Since the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) came into force in May 1994, the IAEA inspectors have not
found any proof of a weapons program and congratulate Iran on its cooperation with
the agency. However American and Israeli security and intelligence services allege
that Iran will very soon in a position to obtain nuclear means.82 U.S. government
analysts today believe in that Iran could produce nuclear weapons within a 5-10 year
period.83
          A 1999 CIA report noted that, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical
weapons and continues to seek technology to create more advanced and self-
sufficient chemical weapon (CW) infrastructure.84 It is suggested that Iran may have
limited capability for BW development.85
          As far as delivery systems are concerned, the situation is more disturbing.  Iran
has several hundred Scud-B and a hundred or so Scud-C missiles. It is mentioned that
China will provide technology for the development of 700-1000 km. range missile
and it is also mentioned that China, North Korea and Iran cooperate to develop
1500km. and 1700km.  range missiles.86 These types of missiles would allow Iran to
target the eastern half of Turkey (almost reaching Ankara).
          At present the southern countries are not capable of conducting an
unconventional – not to mention conventional- threat to the North. They might have
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some kinds of chemical and biological weapons, but the ranges and the accuracy of
their ballistic missiles are limited (Scud-B and Scud-C with the range of maximum
600km). The South is more intent on declaring war on itself than on turning its
attention to the West and even if it wanted to, it is not in a position to do so.87 As a
result, the most likely victims of missile and WMD are in the South, with the
exception of Turkey, a NATO member.88
          But acquisitions of longer range and more accurate systems, even if they are
conventionally armed, can change the picture dramatically, especially for Europe’s
periphery and with significant transatlantic implications.
          First, they can cause huge damage in Europe if triggered in case of a conflict
between South and North. Second, as it was mentioned in the previous parts, the
region is characterised by actual and potential flashpoints for conflict and crisis that
may demand a western response.89 Any kind of military intervention is the most
disturbing thing for the southern states. Hence it is probable that they may retaliate
against Europe (and U.S. military facilities in Europe) in case of an intervention
whether in the Gulf, North Africa, or elsewhere, perhaps even in the Balkans.90 As a
result of this, most probably the vulnerable states -especially southern European
states and Turkey- may be reluctant to commit forces or even to support U.S.
action.91 Hints of this development could be seen in the Gulf experience when the
popular reaction in North Africa and then potential terrorist attacks in European soil
were matters of concern, especially for southern Europeans.92 Also, Turkey was
anxious due to the Iraqi chemicals and missiles. The Iraqi missile attacks on Israel
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and Saudi Arabia indicate implications for that more effective systems can also
circumscribe pro-western support.
          Europe is the natural geographic rear for any military operation in the area, as
it was during the Gulf War.93 Access to the facilities and airspace in southern Europe
and Turkey played an important role in coalition force projection. Some 90 percent
of forces and material sent to the Gulf passed through the Mediterranean region by
air or by sea.94 But, because of the reasons mentioned above, cooperation among the
western allies, in a possible future crisis, can not be as easy as it was during the Gulf
war. Especially the freedom of action of the U.S. across the Mediterranean and in
Europe can be circumscribed.95
          Another concern (especially for the U.S.) is about the increasing vulnerability
of the fleets – during peace or war time- in the Mediterranean Sea in case of
acqusition of more precise systems.96 The possibility of cascading proliferation of
WMD across the entire region, from Algeria to Pakistan is also a disturbing issue.
          Although recognising proliferation as a major risk, the Northern states’
concerns are focusing on non-military security challenges. It is widely believed that
stability in the Mediterranean stems essentially from non-military factors.97
Economic and social underdevelopment coupled with over population and with the
rule of authoritarian regimes bring about instability domestically. Such domestic
instability turns regionally into spill over effects that intrude in Europe and affect
European security. What is at stake is not national security in a conventional sense,
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but the security of European welfare and the civic order.98 The most important spill-
over effects concerning the North are related to immigration, terrorism and
internationally organised criminality.99 Also the increasing energy dependency of the
North to the South is a vital issue.
1.2. Non-military Challenges Stemming from the South
1.2.1. Increasing Economic Gap
           There is a big economic gap between the North and the South, and this gap is
widening day by day. In 1992, the World Bank estimated the ratio of GDP per capita
of European Community to that of the South to be 12 to 1, a number expected to
grow to 20 to 1 by 2010.100 At present GDP per head with a figure of 19.242$ for the
European Union member states and 1589$ for southern Mediterranean countries.101
There variety of reasons for the bad economy of the region.
          After declaring of their independence, the southern states developed industrial
policies based on heavy state intervention and protectionism. In theory,
protectionism was intended to help the growth of infant industries by enabling them
to compete with foreign producers on the domestic market. At the beginning it
seemed as if this policy worked. However there was a price to be paid. Because
protectionism hindered competition and in the absence of competition input factors
such as labour and capital tend to be more expensive resulting in higher prices for
consumer, a poor allocation of sources, and lower productivity.102 Later on the
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governments were no longer able to pump money into the under-performing state
enterprises due to their increasing debts.103
          The weakness of the economic relations among the southern countries is
another reason for their economic backwardness. The intra-regional trade is variously
estimated at 4 to 8 percent of total trade.104 There are some reasons for this situation.
First, rivalries, confrontation and question of hegemony prevented the states form
economic relations. The question of who will gain more was an important
impediment. There was/is no mutual trust among them. It is clear that rational
economic development and cooperation can not develop in the absence of minimum
of trust and good faith between the partners.105 Second, production in the countries in
the area is not complementary – mainly hydrocarbons, textiles, vegetables and citrus
fruits- which means limited trade.106 Third, the technological capacity of the area is
unable to respond to its needs which must be met from the outside region. Due to its
geographic proximity and historical ties the EU is the best ‘outside region’.
          Most of their trade is conducted with the EU states. They are highly dependent
on EU markets, which is best captured by statistics: 55.7 percent of Southern export
is sold to the EU and 51.7 percent of their imports originated in the EU. In contrast,
the EU is far less dependent – with the exception of oil products and gas- on trade
with its southern neighbours: only 9.3 percent of the EU export reached to the region,
and imports from the South amount to only 7.2 percent of EU’s total.107  The
proportions of European trade accounted for North America and the Far East are
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each almost double than that of the Mediterranean.108 As a result of this the southern
states are at the mercy of the EU’s economic performance and its trade laws –quotas,
customs’ tariffs, export schedules, target prices, and quality standards.109 Robust
growth in Europe leads to greater demand for imports, benefiting the South, but slow
growth has an opposite, negative effect. Although quotas and tariffs for most
industrial products have been eliminated, textile products are still being subject to
some constraints and entry of agricultural products is restricted by the measures laid
out in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the two fields in which the South is in
a advantageous position to some extent.110
          Lack of foreign direct investment is another reason for the economic
backwardness of the South. It attracts only about 3 percent of the world’s foreign
direct investment.111 The region as whole lacks comparative advantage for the
foreign investor, when compared with Latin America, South and South East Asia and
–with the end of the Cold War- Eastern Europe.112 Political and economic
environment makes this part of the world undesirable for the investor.
          Political instability, bad governance, the bureaucratic nature of the states,
absence of independent and effective legal systems, possibility of state intervention,
lack of predictable long term perspective, reluctance of commercial banks to loan
money, high level of corruption, lack of transparency in business life, lack of trained
accountants and financial analysts, and lack of reliable data, high prices, low wages,
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shortage of job, unwillingness of the governments to make effective reforms with
respect to privatisation and liberalisation, terrorism, conflicts among the states are
some of the factors for the reluctance of the investors.113 Indeed, without adequate
investment, it is unlikely that these states can resolve their internal social problems,
let alone begin to match the patterns of development experienced by the countries of
the developed world or of the rapidly developing world.114
          Also the money spent for armaments has had negative effects for the economic
situation of the South. Security issues were utmost important for the states in the
region, while economic considerations were viewed as entirely subordinate to them
and used only to support to them. Military expenditures take up a far greater
proportion of GNP than anywhere else in the world. Most foreign currency is spent
on arms imports and skilled personnel are employed in defence and this means that
valuable skilled workers are lost to the civilian economy.115
1.2.2. Population Growth and Migration
          In addition to the bad economy, the high rate of the population growth causes
anxiety for Europe, especially for the southern Europe. Since 1960 population of the
region is increasing rapidly as a result of medical advances, better hygiene and
increased food supplies. Today, while the population of the northern shore is
growing by less than 0.3 percent per annum, the population on the southern shore is
increasing by more than 2.5 percent per annum.116  By the year 2015 the total
population of the fifteen EU members will increase by only 13 million, while the
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non-EU Mediterranean will number an additional 170 million people.117 In 1950 two
thirds of the population of the Mediterranean basin lived on its northern shores, by
2025 it is estimated that the situation will have completely reversed itself.118
Overpopulation increases unemployment and poverty which causes migratory
pressures to Europe.
          In the post-war years, due to the labour shortage, immigration was welcomed
by the European countries –notably by West Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland
and Great Britain. The sending countries were also satisfied for two reasons:
emigration was a pressure valve that helped keep rising unemployment in check, and
worker remittances were an important source of income to the national economy. But
the growing unemployment and economic stagnation after the 1973 oil crisis forced
the European countries to follow tighter immigration policies and even a
repatriation program.119
          However, today, the EU member states are home to 4.6 million immigrants
from the non-member Mediterranean states.120 The presence of a large and growing
Muslim population has sparked rise in a xenophobic and racist sentiment amongst
the Europeans, particularly in the light of high unemployment rates.121 The European
governments themselves are greatly concerned about the racist and xenophobic
events, because they are harmful for their domestic security and they have
implications in their relations with the South. Any event in the North is perceived as
an evidence of a fundamental European-Christian hostility towards Islam, as a result
of this Islamic movements, both, in Europe and in the South gains power with
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significant implications in international relations.122 Another concern for the
governments in the North is that immigration creates an environment in which
terrorists are able to move with relative ease.123
          Indeed, zero immigration is self-defeating. With the birth rate stagnant or in
decline in many European countries, some immigration will be necessary to prevent
the population from decreasing in the 21st century.124 Also there is a need for
unskilled labours which the Europeans loath to perform and the immigrant workers
currently occupy.125 But the flow must be under control. The EU, with its hundreds
of kilometres of coastlines, is vulnerable to illegal immigration. Today, it is
estimated that 1.3 to 1.5 million undocumented immigrants reside in Spain, Italy,
Greece and Portugal.126 Because of the high unemployment, low living standards,
and political turmoil in the South, it is highly unlikely that illegal immigration will
stop. A political turmoil may also cause a refugee flux, the most dreadful thing for
the Europeans.
1.2.3. The Algerian Turmoil
          At present, the states in the South consist of authoritarian governments headed
by powerful individual rulers –a president or a hereditary king- backed by politically
and economically influential elite groups. There are usually few constitutional
constraints on the powers of these authoritarian heads of state. They are often able to
appoint key ministers, rule by decree and declare state of emergency.  Apparently
there is little or no democracy. Only certain political parties are tolerated and only
those parties closely associated with the president or the king are usually most
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successful. There are close ties between the governing elites and the leading military
officers. Public opinion is ostensibly of marginal importance.127
          The bad economic condition, high unemployment rates, high inflation,
poverty, the deteriorating living conditions, the housing problem, insufficient welfare
system, corruption of the ruling elites, the repression of people and human right
abuses, no tolerance for political opposition groups and the lack of rapid
improvement of the situation cause social unrest in the South. The public has begun
to question the legitimacy of the ruling elites.128  The leaders are under increasing
pressure from their own publics to introduce solid economic and social reforms. But
they are not prepared to make serious attempts that could damage the interest of
those pro-government bureaucrats and other elite groups who have benefited from
the lack of reforms hitherto.129  As a result of this, the Islamists benefit from the
current situation. The failure of various secular regimes to deliver on the promises of
material prosperity and improved education and welfare made over many years
diminish their credibility.130 Also the West is accused because of its support for the
governments. In this sense, the rise of radical Islam is a result of anger towards
governments and resentment against the West.131
          Although an Islamic take over is not expected in the foreseeable future, the
Europeans and the governments in the south are apprehensive for the rise of radical
Islamism in the region. The Algerian case is the main reason for their concern.
          In Algeria, the National Liberation Front (FLN), the leader of the long and
bloody independence war against French colonialism in the period of 1954-1962 was
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on power since independence. In the post-independence period the economic and
social condition in the country was malign. Due to the decline in the world oil prices
in 1985-86 the economic situation in Algeria –which was/is highly dependent on the
export of hydrocarbons- deteriorated significantly. Even basic goods such as eggs
were frequently unavailable. Products found in the local markets were so highly
priced that ordinary wage earners could not afford them. In addition to this,
widespread corruption in the country made the situation worse.
          As a result of this, widescale demonstrations and bloody rioting occurred in
1988. In response the government amended the constitution and opened up the
political system to political parties other than the ruling FLN and promised elections.
The new constitution also included provisions referring in the removal of the armed
forces from political life which had been at the center of every government since
Algeria won its independence. The amendment allowed Algeria’s Islamist groups to
come to the political forefront.
          The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the most organised and effective
opposition party. It was able to mobilise large masses, particularly unemployed urban
people, with the help of its organisational framework and of the network of mosques
it controlled, by making populist propaganda against the existing regime and by
presenting itself as the only proper and alternative to the ruling elite.
          In the June 1990 local elections, the FIS, by capitalising on the popular hatred
for the FLN, won control of thirty-two of the forty-eight provinces. In other words it
got 55 percent of the votes cast. Later on it was victorious again in the first round of
the National Assembly elections in December 1991, polling 47 percent of the vote.
As result of this, the military which was deeply against to the Islamist and to their
agenda and fearful of their own fate, intervened and cancelled the second round.
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          The military leaders established their own ruling body: the High State
Committee (HSC) and formally dissolved the FIS as a political party in March 1992.
Consequently clashes between the security forces and the Islamist began. Groups,
linked to the FIS or other Islamist elements that have never enjoyed the constitution
or the electoral system of the government, launched armed assaults against the
regime and its supporters. Anyone perceived to be supportive of the government or
critical of Islamism began to be attacked: ministers, intellectuals, journalists, writers
and foreigners living in Algeria. Until now more than one hundred thousand people
were killed on all sides  -although it was not a civil war because masses did not go to
the streets and support the terrorist activities.132
          At the early days of the turmoil a high level of migration was expected towards
North      –particularly France, Spain, Portugal and Italy- and to neighbour countries
–Morocco and Tunisia- but it did not happen. But the picture, when the Islamist
terrorism in Europe considered was not so good. Algerian Islamists with the help of
their supporters in Europe carried out some terrorist activities against the states
supporting Algerian ruling elites, such as the hijacking of Air France jet in 1994 and
the terrorist events in Paris in 1995-1996.133
1.2.4. Terrorism and Organizational Crime
          One of the most worrisome things for the European as well as the southern
countries is terrorism. European countries are fearful of being targets of Muslim
fundamentalist terrorism, but more so the US or US targets in Europe. The proximity
of the terrorism supporting states (Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq) makes the
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situation more serious.134 It is estimated that one third of all terrorist activities
worldwide take place in the region.135
          Terrorism is closely linked up with international criminality which traffics in
human beings, armaments and drug. Most probably the economic resources
generated by organised crime are use for destabilising the society, the political
system, the administration and the economy of the country. Particularly drugs are a
direct and a very serious threat to the social foundations of states. There are
important drug producing areas in the region, for example Morocco is the major
source for hashish.136 The Mediterranean and the Balkans constitute for major transit
route for drug trafficking to Western European countries.137 Turkey and Spain are the
two of the three major drug trafficking entry points (the other one is Russia). The
disappearance of border controls among the EU states is a critical factor with regard
to the drug trafficking. Today, surface trade between Morocco and Germany, for
example, has to pass only one international border.138
1.2.5. Environmental Problems
          Environmental problems in the region are also seriously considered by the
North. Once beautiful shores are deteriorated due to poorly planned development.
The rich Mediterranean vegetation and the unique landscape are replaced by
unpleasant urban, industrial, and tourist complexes.139 Untreated sewage from these
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facilities flows directly into the Mediterranean. In addition to this, oil pollution
caused both by accidental spills and by the deliberate dumping of oil-contaminated
sea water (routine dumping to clean the tanks of ships) harm the lives of the region’s
inhabitants and harm the health of people who consume seafood. Over fishing,
especially by giant nets contribute to the depletion to fish stocks as well as to death
of thousands of other sea animals that entangle. Agricultural activities also contribute
to degradation of the Mediterranean environment. Overuse of arable land, combined
with poor irrigation, particularly in the South, leads erosion, salinisation, and
occasionally outright desertification.140 Deforestation due to fires, overgrazing and
the deliberate burning of shrublands and grasslands is also a nuisance. The presence
of nuclear power plants – not to mention the nuclear powered ships and submarines
in the Mediterranean Sea itself- is another cause of worry.141
          The North, particularly France, Italy and Spain are alone responsible for 70 to
80 percent of all the pollution in the Mediterranean basin and 85 percent of the
region’s industrial production. However, the South is accused of the environmental
problems facing the Mediterranean. The southern states are responsible for 15
percent of industrial production but 20-30 percent of its pollution. This means that
they are proportionally bigger polluters than their European counterparts.142
1.2.6. Scarcity of Water
          Perhaps the most critical environmental problem facing the region is the lack
of water resources.143 Because of the rapid population growth, water resources in the
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Mediterranean basin are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive. It is suggested
that the time is coming when water must be treated as a valuable resource, like oil,
not a free one like air.144 The solutions found to this problem are not effective.
Dispute over the ownership of water are becoming common; rivers and underground
waters do not stop at national borders. There is already friction among Turkey, Syria
and Iraq for the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, among Israel, Lebanon,
Jordan and Palestine for the waters of Litani, Yarmouk and Jordan rivers and among
Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia for the Nile rivers.145 The governments of Syria, Egypt
and Jordan have announced on numerous occasions their willingness to go to war to
protect their water supplies.146 The North not only concerns about a possible conflict
stemming from the ownership issue, but also the effects of water to the
industrialisation of the southern states.
1.2.7. Energy Security
          Energy security is the most important issue that the Europeans are concerned
about. It is highly probable that any problem in the South or between North and
South could have serious repercussions for Europe, but any disruption in the oil or
natural gas flow will be the worst case. Because Europe is heavily dependent on the
MENA for its energy supplies, as nearly as 60 percent of its needs in hydrocarbon
supplies come from there.147 Approximately 3000 ships daily pass through the
Mediterranean and meet the demands of the European states.148
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          Europe (particularly southern European states) depends on North Africa for
roughly 25 percent of its natural gas. 74 percent of Spain’s natural gas needs, 50
percent of Italy’s, 29 percent of France’s, 10 percent of Portugal’s are imported from
the Maghreb. Most of these supplies reaches Europe through two routes, the Trans-
Med line (inaugurated in 1986) linking Italy and Algeria (the owner of the fifth
natural gas reserve in the world) via Tunisia and the new Trans-Maghreb pipeline
(1996) supplying Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal (as well as France, Belgium,
and Germany) via Morocco. It is also planned to expand the existing Libya-Italy link.
The fixed infrastructure and the far less flexibility to respond the supply interruptions
make the natural gas issue more sensitive than the oil.149 Even though a deliberate cut
off is not expected, any interruption as a result of a turmoil or anarchy is not
ignored.150
          It is also considered that the importance of the Mediterranean as a major transit
route for the transportation of energy products will increase after the construction
and operation of pipelines transporting oil from Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus.151
          The large number and different kinds of security challenges force the northern
and southern states to make cooperation. The Europeans are well aware of the fact
that costs of taking no action will be much higher in the long run than are the costs of
taking action.152 Domestic pressure is also an important impetus. Political radicalism
and growing violence, the authoritarian nature of regimes, and numerous violations
of human rights put the European governments under public pressure to develop
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policies for the region.153 On the other side of the Mediterranean, the governments
are under increasing pressure from outside (from the west in particular) and from
below (from their own public) to introduce serious political and economic reforms.154
They cannot anymore exploit the east-west tension and call their patrons in case of a
trouble. It is evident for them that there are solid problems which they can not deal
with unilaterally, therefore cooperation with the North is vital.
          The end of the Cold War has lifted many of the constraints on regional
cooperation in the Mediterranean. The opening of the Arab-Israeli peace talks in
1991 and the subsequent moves towards Arab-Israeli settlement created a better
climate for cooperation. The Algerian case with its serious implications on both sides
of the Mediterranean showed that a multilateral and comprehensive approach is vital
for the security and stability of the whole region.
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CHAPTER 2: NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative
2.1. NATO and the Mediterranean in the Cold War
          During the Cold War, the Mediterranean played a marginal role in the East-
West strategic competition and NATO strategy.  NATO officials were much more
concerned with a possible development in the Central front and the East.155 The
principal focus in the Mediterranean was to limit Soviet influence in the area. There
was a competition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to secure the support of the
governments in North Africa and in the Middle East.156
          The Soviet Union attempted to gain political influence in states such as
Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria. It was seeking to present itself as the champion of
the forces of decolonisation and anti-Western imperialism. Particularly this policy
was more evident in Moscow’s military, political and economic support for Egypt.157
          In 1964 to show its flag and to counter the US Sixth Fleet, the Soviet Union
established the Fifth Eskadra in the Mediterranean. By 1973 the Soviet naval
presence in the Mediterranean was at its peak.158 The Atlantic Alliance was
determined to keep the Soviet Union away from securing access to and use of naval
bases in the area. NATO officials feared that the Soviet Union could threat the lines
of communication and disrupt trade routes. The safety of the energy flow from the
Persian Gulf, the Middle East and North Africa was very important in the thinking of
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many NATO policy-makers.159 Unlike the US Sixth Fleet, the Fifth  Eskadra failed to
obtain  full base rights in the  Mediterranean  with the exception of the
Egyptian port of Alexandria until 1972. It had only limited access rights some ports
in Libya, Algeria, Malta and Syria. As a result of this the Soviet naval presence in the
Mediterranean declined after 1973 and the Soviet naval threat diminished.160
          In response to the Soviet Union’s growing interest in the Mediterranean, in
1961 NATO set up an Expert Working Group on the Middle East and the Maghreb
and in 1967 an Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. Composed of area specialists
from allied countries, these groups conducted traditional monitoring of Soviet related
activities, as well as assessments of region specific issues.161 Also in 1968 NATO
decided to establish a Maritime Airforce in Naples to coordinate surveillance in the
Mediterranean and in 1969 agreed to deploy a naval call-on-forces for the
Mediterranean, NAVOCFORMED.162
          In fact, at the time of the Cold War the main challenge NATO faced in the
Southern Region did not stem from the Soviet Union or other non-NATO states in
the area. The main challenge was rather one of internal management. This was
because of different political interests and national concerns of member states in vast
territory stretching from the Azores to Ardahan in eastern Turkey.163 Particularly
there were differences of opinion among the allies concerning how to respond to
conflicts and crises in and around the Mediterranean, which is closely related to the
out-of-area issue.164
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          The term “in-area” as opposed to “out-of-area” is defined in Article 6 of the
North Atlantic Treaty. According to the Article 5, any armed attack against one or
more of the allies, or on the forces, vessels or of the aircraft of the parties in or over
of the territory defined in the Article 6 would be considered by NATO an attack
against all members of the Alliance and necessary measures would be taken to
defend the victim. But, what would happen if the interests of the Alliance members
were threatened in-out-of area? Was it possible that all the interests of the members
were the same? In other words, was it possible that all challenges in-out-of area were
threatening for the all members?
          Throughout the Cold War, the out-of-area debate tended to concentrate on
whether NATO would participate in out-of-area military operations to protect the
interests of the Atlantic Alliance members and most likely thwart Soviet
ambitions.165
          The out-of-area issue gained significant importance after the fall of the Shah in
Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US administration feared that the
Soviet Union could exploit the situation in Iran and disrupt the western oil coming
from the Persian Gulf. Hence it announced the establishment of the Rapid Reaction
Force without consulting the allies. On the other hand, the European allies, though
they were much more dependent on the energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, did
not share the fears of the US. They were in favour of keeping the detente and not
damaging the trade relations with Moscow.166
           There was much more unity among the allies with respect to the out-of-area
issue when the Iran-Iraq war intensified in the 1980s. At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
War, naval forces from the United States, Britain and France coordinated their
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activities at the operational level in the Indian Ocean in order to keep open the Straits
of Hormuz to commercial traffic. Later on Italy and Netherlands participated in these
activities. These out-of-area operations were basically preventive military measures.
They were coordinated at the operational but were not sanctioned by NATO.167
NATO member states came to realize that South-South problems, in addition to the
perceived Soviet threat, could have a major negative effect on their economic
interests.168 These developments in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf had
significantly increased NATO’s defence considerations in the Mediterranean.
          In practice, throughout the Cold War, NATO did not participate in any out-of-
area operation. At most, cooperation was limited to coordinated naval activities at the
operational level among a handful of allies.169 By the 1980s the southern Europeans
realized that they were more vulnerable to the developments in North Africa and in
the Middle East. There was a growing awareness among them that the threats to their
security were more likely to come from crisis and conflicts beyond their southern
borders than from an East-West confrontation.170 The northern members of NATO
were not so much interested in the developments in the Mediterranean.
2.2. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue
2.2.1. Background to NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative
          With the end of the Cold War, the focus of European security has shifted
from Central Europe to the Southern region.171 The direct Soviet threat against the
Central front has dissolved. More diverse and more indirect threats and challenges on
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European periphery, which were elaborated in the previous chapter, have eclipsed the
Russian threat. The events in the Gulf, Algeria and in the Balkans have shown that
important alliance interests were in risk. The distinction between European and
Mediterranean security has become increasingly blurred as a result of the spillover
effect of the problems.172
          The Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean began to discuss the emergence of
the new security risks in the Mediterranean as the proliferation of WMD and
capabilities of their delivery means, the growth of instability and extremism in North
Africa and the conflict in Bosnia.173
          The Gulf War was a milestone in the evolution of the Mediterranean security.
It was not a formal NATO operation, but Alliance planning, procedures and habits of
cooperation played an important role in the coalition activity.174 NATO naval forces
and aircraft were alerted to protect air and sea lines of communication in the
Mediterranean. Minesweepers were also dispatched to the Mediterranean as it was
feared that Iraq and perhaps Libya might attempt to hinder Western access to oil
supplies.175 It was a reminder that the southern hemisphere was not only suffering
from serious economic and social problems, but was also subject to a number of
disputes over regional hegemony and an associated trend to over-armament issues
that can not fail to concern the European and Western powers.176 In particular, the
Iraqi crisis highlighted the issue of WMD and the capacity of their delivery at longer
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ranges. 177 Iraq fired more than 70 Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia although
they were only tipped with conventional warheads.178
          Popular demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein, an aggressor, and
against the West throughout North Africa and in the Middle East was also a cause of
concern for the wset. Because of support of some of the allies was vital for the
success of the coalition forces. The Gulf War underlined the importance of the
Mediterranean for power projection. Any problem among the allies would severely
complicate the planning for the operation. Overall, the Gulf Crisis made clear that
European security and the future of NATO would be more deeply affected by
developments outside of the traditional NATO area.179
          Bosnia has had the effect of enlarging, at least in a de facto sense, the NATO
area of responsibility, as well as the field of actors in crisis management.180 NATO as
an organization involved in a number of out-of-area roles in Bosnia. In line with a
decision taken by NATO ambassadors in September 1992, individual allies provided
troops to protect and escort humanitarian aid convoys in the region under UN
command. NATO proposed to support peacekeeping operations under the mandate of
the UN Security Council and NATO units and resources were used to support the
headquarters of the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). NATO vessels enforced
UN maritime embargo on the former Yugoslavia. NATO aircraft enforced a UN ban
on unauthorized flights over Bosnia, conducted limited air strikes to protect
UNPROFOR and to maintain military exclusion zones. NATO units also helped to
enforce a ceasefire around Sarajeva and in central Bosnia. In short, in the former
Yugoslavia, NATO forces participated in various out-of-area missions –in
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peacemaking, sanctions enforcing and cease-fire enforcement tasks. Later on, NATO
troops with the units from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco participated in the multilateral
peacekeeping forces known as IFOR and SFOR.181
          Cooperation  between  NATO  and   non-NATO  member  Mediterranean
countries  in peacekeeping missions was a positive development. However there was
a great criticism, particularly from the Islamic media and militant Islamic groups
because of the late response of the Western community to the Balkan crisis in
comparison to the rapid defeat of the Iraqi forces. It was pointed out that in the
Bosnian case there was no oil and the principal victims were Muslims, not
Christians.182 Such claims have exacerbated the bad image of NATO in the South
and enabled the Islamic groups to boost their popularity at home.
          In line with a trend that has been increasingly evident since early 1980s, the
NATO London Declaration of 1990 emphasized the non-military dimension of
security. In the second paragraph it was stated that “We reaffirm that security and
stability do not lie solely in the military dimension and we intend to enhance the
political component of our Alliance as promised by Article 2 of our treaty.”183
          At the end of the November1990, just before the Gulf War, NATO Secretary-
General Manfred Wörner, in a speech noted the emergence of an arc of tension from
Maghreb to the Middle East. He also mentioned about the proliferation issue and the
problems that Saddam like dictators could cause. Rapid population growth, resource
conflicts, migration, economic underdevelopment, the spread of religious
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fundamentalism and terrorism were also emphasized in his speech as causes for
tension.184
          After the Gulf War, in June 1990, NATO foreign ministers declared that “The
Alliance must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are
beyond the focus of traditional alliance concerns, but that can have direct
implications for our security.”185
          In November 1991, at the Rome Summit, the new Strategic Concept
emphasized the broad approach to security. In paragraph 8, new security risks were
defined as, in contrast to the predominant threat of the past, multifaceted and
multidirectional. It was stated that security and stability had political, economic,
social and environmental dimension as well as military dimension (paragraph 24). In
paragraph 9 it was stated that serious economic, social and political difficulties,
including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes could threaten the allies’ interests.
Alliance security interests could also be affected by other risks, including
proliferation of WMD, disruption of vital resources and actions of terrorism and
sabotage (paragraph 12). The enlarged concept of security would give NATO more
freedom of maneuver to engage in dialogue with other states.186 The importance of
crisis management and preventive diplomacy was also emphasized (paragraph 31).
There were also some statements with respect to importance of dialogue. Even
though the Strategic Concept referred extensively to challenges and risks that may
stem from Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the
Middle East and the Gulf were also mentioned. In this regard, the Alliance’s desire
for cooperation and the close link between the stability and security of the region and
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the Alliance were underlined. In particular, the Alliance’s concern about the WMD
and their delivery means and the overarmament in the region were underpinned
(paragraph 11).
          In a speech, in June 1992, Wörner stated that with the demise of the Soviet
Union, the debate over the out-of-area lost its significance and it was more easy for
NATO to be active in out-of-area.187
          In1992, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), which has major influence on
NATO officials and their interests in the Mediterranean, published a report. In this
report it was stated that NATO should discuss how it could act out of area rather than
whether it should act or not. It was also underpinned that the Alliance’s interests
were important as much as the defence of the territory of its members. In this regard,
the report stressed that NATO should never let any disruption of energy supplies and
should prevent states from acquiring WMD.188
          The Final Communique of the NAC meeting in Athens in June 1993 was the
first official NATO document stressing that security of Europe was closely related to
the security of the Mediterranean and that dialogue and cooperation was necessary
for the stability of the region.189 However a need for a NATO-Mediterranean
dialogue was not mentioned specifically.
          The NAC communique published in December, just before the Brussels
Summit, did not mention the Mediterranean. The Brussels Summit Declaration,
particularly because of the lobbying of Italy and Spain referred to the Mediterranean.
In paragraph 22, the close relation between the security in Europe and the
Mediterranean and the member states pleasure for the developments in the Middle
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East peace process were emphasized. It was also stated that the breakthrough had
also opened the way for dialogue, understanding and confidence building in the
region. The Council in Permanent Session was directed to review the overall
situation. The paragraph ended with underlining NATO’s support for the efforts for
the stability of the region.190
          The Final Communique released after the NAC meeting in Istanbul, in June
1994 stated that political developments around the Mediterranean were considered
carefully. The Council in Permanent Session was directed to examine how NATO
could contribute to regional stability.191 At the moment, the situation in North Africa,
particularly in Algeria and the proliferation issue were the main concerns.192
           Mediterranean security was one of the topics discussed by the NATO defence
ministers at the informal meeting in Seville on 29-30 September 1994. At this
meeting French and US officials, who had hesitations until then, made more explicit
statements in favor of NATO involvement in the Mediterranean.193 In this meeting
necessary consensus to launch a dialogue with non-member Mediterranean countries
was reached among the allies. Then the question was which country should be
invited.
          The Final Communique issued at the ministerial meeting of the NAC in
December 1994 stated that NATO was ready to establish contacts on case by case
basis with the Mediterranean non-member countries to contribute to the stability of
the region. The Council in Permanent Session was directed to continue to review the
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situation, to develop the details of the proposed dialogue and to initiate appropriate
preliminary contacts.194 Finally, NATO announced the beginning of NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue on February 8, 1995.
2.2.2. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue
          As a result of the consensus among the member states five countries were
invited to the dialogue. These states were Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and
Tunisia. Before the invitation NATO officials had been ensured that their offer
would not be rejected. Initially NATO officials planned to invite only three countries
which were Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. But, because of its geostrategic importance
for Portugal and Spain, even though it was not a Mediterranean country, Mauritania
was also included. Israel was also invited due to the US administration’s insistence.
          In the initial round of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Jordan, even though it
fulfilled the ad hoc criteria and it had great interest, was excluded because of its
support for Iraq during the 1991-1992 Gulf Crisis.195 It joined the dialogue in
November 1995.
          The dialogue countries differ in the nature of their political systems and in the
conditions of their economies. There are certain tensions between the Arab countries
and Israel. However, they fulfil certain criteria to be partner for the dialogue. Each of
them had reasonable stable government, unlike for example Algeria. The leadership
of each of the states had some claim to legitimacy. Each of them is, in general pro-
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western and each of them had normalized their relations with each other, including
Israel.196
          As it was declared at the very beginning of the NATO-Mediterranean
dialogue, it was open to other non-member Mediterranean countries. This policy was
also emphasized in the NAC Ministerial Meeting at the end of the May 1995. It was
announced that further discussions with these and other Mediterranean countries
would lead to the establishment of a fruitful dialogue.197 However, NATO officials
are in favor of keeping the number limited. Because it is widely believed in that
small number is relatively more manageable.
          For the reasons mentioned above Libya, Syria and Lebanon have not been
invited to participate in the dialogue and it is highly unlikely that they will be invited
without a change in leadership and a dramatic turnout in their foreign policies.198
          The dialogue is not a reaction to a particular event or a threat, but rather is a
part of NATO’s overall cooperative approach to security.199 The main purpose of the
dialogue is to contribute security and stability in the Mediterranean, achieving a
better mutual understanding and correcting any misperceptions between NATO and
the Mediterranean partner countries by building confidence through greater
transparency, discussion and cooperation.200
          The dialogue is progressive in nature. This has allowed the content of the
dialogue to evolve.201 It is bilateral in structure. This principle has proved extremely
important for the Mediterranean partners. Israel and the Arab states in question don’t
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want to be seen as a definite group.202 They wish to conduct the dialogue as
individual sovereign states. This has consequently made the dialogue less vulnerable
to disruption due to political developments ongoing elsewhere in the region. Despite
the predominantly bilateral character, the dialogue allows for multilateral meetings
on a case-by-case basis.203
          All the Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperative
activities and discussion with NATO. What is offered to one dialogue partner is
offered to all the others in the dialogue. However, within this non-discriminatory
framework, partners are free to choose the extent and intensity of their
participation.204 As it was stated by the Secretary-General Javier Solana the initiative
is a dialogue of “variable geometry.”205 The dialogue countries are also free to
participate or not in various cooperative activities.206
          The Mediterranean dialogue consists of political dialogue and participation in
specific activities. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political
discussions with the possibility of additional meetings or briefings on a case-by-case
basis. These discussions provide an opportunity for extensive briefings on NATO
activities, including its programs of external outreach and partnership, its internal
adaptation and its general approach to building cooperative security structures. In
turn, Mediterranean partners are invited to share their views with NATO on stability
and security in the Mediterranean region.207
          Until the establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) in
July 1997, the Alliance’s Political Committee had the overall responsibility for the
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dialogue. Talks were held at NATO headquarters on bilateral basis between officials
from the Political Affairs Division of NATO’s International Staff and representatives
from the embassies in Brussels of the Mediterranean dialogue countries.208
          The dialogue started with a number of invitations made by Secretary-General
Willy Claes. Starting on February 24, Claes began to receive the ambassadors of the
Mediterranean dialogue countries based in Brussels.209 The first meeting between
NATO’s International Staff and one of the dialogue countries, Mauritania in this
case, was held on May 1995. In the spring and summer of 1995 two rounds of
bilateral talks were concluded between NATO’s International Staff and four of the
dialogue countries. Morocco, protesting Willy Claes’ unfortunate statements with
respect to Islam, had not participated in any talks during that period.210
          The first talks were simply exploratory in nature. NATO officials explained
the nature and purpose of the Alliance in addition to the its new missions of
peacekeeping and sounded out the concerns of the dialogue countries.211 At this
phase, there was no intention of multilateralizing of the talks because of the reasons
mentioned above.
          As it was stated in the Final Communique of the NAC meeting in Brussels, in
December 1995, NATO member states were satisfied with the talks held in that year.
However, at the same time they were aware of the fact that the dialogue had not been
fully established and they emphasized the need to explore the possibilities for a
permanent dialogue.212
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          Later on, the talks had been based on much more established footing.
Discussions continued on the basis of two rounds of talks each year between
NATO’s International Staff and each of the dialogue countries. Talks were no longer
merely exploratory. Political, economic and social developments in the
Mediterranean and prospects for regional cooperation were the new topics.213
          In June 1996 multilateralization was introduced. But this was not discussions
and debates with the six Mediterranean dialogue countries. Dialogue within the
dialogue strictly remained bilateral. Both NATO officials and the representatives of
the dialogue countries favored this arrangement. Only briefings were referred to here.
In June and December 1996 the dialogue countries were invited as a group briefings
related to the recently concluded meetings of the NAC. In September they attended a
briefing on civil-emergency planning.214
          The establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) in July
1997 was a significant step in the progressive dialogue. The Final Communique
released at the ministerial meeting of the NAC in Sintra, in May 1997 stated that the
Alliance wanted to further enhance the dialogue and improve its overall political
visibility as an effort of confidence building and cooperation.215 This was the first
time an official NATO text referred to the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue in terms
of “confidence building.”216 In that meeting a decision was taken to recommend to
the Heads of State and Government to formally establish a committee having the
overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue. As a result of this, in the
Madrid Meeting, in July 1997, the Heads of State and Government decided to
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establish under the authority of the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the
Mediterranean Cooperation Group.217
          The MCG replaced the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean which had aimed
at supporting the Mediterranean Dialogue. It has the overall responsibility for the
dialogue as well as conducting the political discussions with individual partners. The
MCG consists of political advisers from each of the nineteen national delegations. It
meets as group of nineteen to discuss policy and other matters of direct relevance to
the dialogue. However, it is possible that ‘reinforced’ meetings with representatives
from the capitals of the NATO members can be held. The chairperson of NATO’s
Political Committee can also chair the MCG. The MCG gathers to meet separately
once a year with the representatives of the dialogue countries in a “19+1” format. If
necessary additional “19+1” meetings can also be convened.218 The first discussions
between the allies and the individual participant countries took place on November
20-21, 1997.219
          The creation of MCG has added a high degree of visibility to the Alliance’s
Mediterranean dimension.220 Mediterranean issues would become a permanent item
on the agenda of the Political Committee. Unlike the previous Ad Hoc Group on the
Mediterranean, the MCG could make recommendations to the Political Committee
and by extension to the NAC. Dialogue countries were no longer restricted to
contacts with the NATO officials whose room for manoeuvre was limited, but were
direct touch with representatives from the national delegations at NATO
headquarters in Brussels.221
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          In practice, in spite of the foundation of the MCG, the issues discussed
between NATO officials and the representatives of the dialogue countries were
almost the same as the ones before the creation of the MCG. Sensitive issues, such as
the proliferation of WMD, were avoided. It seems very difficult to tackle with the
proliferation issue despite the common interest of the all the participants of the
Mediterranean Dialogue. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance is to
prevent proliferation from occurring or should it occur, to reverse it through
diplomatic means.222 But, even though the proliferation of WMD and ballistic
missiles should be among the central issues for discussion in the dialogue, it is
avoided because of the great cleavage between the Alliance and the Arab World.
WMD issue, for the Arab Dialogue states, particularly for Egypt, is seen through the
lenses of the strategic competition with Israel. The Alliance concern focuses on the
Arab World’s program while not mentioning about the Israel’s arsenal. Many states
in the dialogue view this as an evidence of a double standard.223 The Arab World
feels that it is the North that poses threat to the South not vice versa.224 NATO
officials don’t want to risk the dialogue, at least at the moment, by discussing the
issue.
          Following the foundation of the MCG more emphasis and importance was
placed on the cooperative activities between NATO and the dialogue countries.
There were some activities before the establishment of the MCG in the field of
information and science. Such as, with regard to information, the key component of
the initiative facilitating mutual understanding, NATO had established contacts with
the opinion leaders from the dialogue countries in order to explain the aims and
objectives of the Alliance. In October and November 1996, two conferences were
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held in Rome devoted to security issues in the Mediterranean to which academics
from the dialogue countries were invited. In November 1996 opinion leaders from
these countries were received at NATO headquarters in Brussels.225
          In the field of science, in November 1995, the dialogue countries were
requested to nominate certain “contact points” to receive and disseminate
information related to NATO’s scientific activities. In the same month NATO
announced that the dialogue countries could send their scientists on a self-funded
bases to the scientific meetings organized by the Science Committee.226 The visit of
the Defense College Commandant to the defense colleges in Egypt, Israel, Jordan
and Tunisia in 1996 to plan a curriculum and to explore the areas of possible
cooperation was the only military related activities.
          With the establishment of the MCG the number and scope of the activities
have increased. By the end of the 1997, the first annual program between NATO and
the dialogue countries had been prepared. These programs included activities in
information, civil emergency planning (CEP), science and defense related areas.227
          In the field of information, in October 1997, for the first time, parliamentarians
from the six dialogue countries visited NATO headquarters and met Secretary-
General Solana.228 In November 1997, NATO helped sponsor two academic
conferences in Rome that analyzed Mediterranean security issues. In December 1997
another international seminar on security issues in the Mediterranean was convened
in Ebenhausen, Germany, with NATO support.229
                                                                                                                                                                    
224 Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.130
225 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
226 Ibid. p.177.
227 Bin, op. cit. note 199, p.25.
228 Speech by NATO Secretary-General Solana, at the Centre Militaredi Studi Strategici/RAND
International Conference on the Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, Rome, November 10,
1997.
229 Winrow, op cit. note 10, p.180.
57
In June, the dialogue countries participated in a seminar on “The Vulnerability of
Food and Agriculture in Emergencies and Natural Disasters” organized by NATO in
Vienna.230 In addition, NATO together with the Greek authorities sponsored a
seminar designed specifically for the Mediterranean dialogue countries in November
1998 on “Natural Disaster Reduction in the Mediterranean Basin.” The seminar
brought together heads of CEP agencies from NATO and the dialogue countries for
the first time.231 In October 1998, journalists –for the first time-, academicians and
parliamentarians from the dialogue countries were invited to Brussels for briefings
on the Mediterranean Initiative.232
          In 1998, NATO also awarded its first Institutional Fellowships which aimed to
promote study and research in areas of particular interest to the organisation,
primarily alliance security and political issues, to scholars from the dialogue
countries. Five fellowships were awarded to scholars from Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania and Morocco.233 Later on, three more fellowships have been awarded to
the dialogue countries: One to Israel and two to Morocco.234
          In the Valencia Conference on “The Mediterranean Dialogue and the new
NATO” in February 1999, for the first time NATO ambassadors and the
representatives from the dialogue countries came together to discuss jointly the way
ahead for the Mediterranean Dialogue.235
          The establishment of the “Contact Point Embassies” in the dialogue countries
was an important step in the effort to exchange information. In May 1998, NATO
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officials decided to establish contact points in the embassy of a NATO member state
in each of the capitals of the dialogue countries. These contact points would be
source of information on NATO activities for the general public in the dialogue
countries.236
          In the field of science, in 1998 funds enabled the dialogue country scientists to
participate in NATO sponsored Advanced Research Workshops, Advanced Study
Institutes, Collaborate Research Grants and Science Fellowships.237 The
Mediterranean dialogue countries can receive and disseminate information on
NATO’s scientific activities and participate in meetings conducted under the
auspices of NATO Science Committee, including symposia and other special
activities.238 For example, in November 2000 they participated in the “6th NATO
Blood Conference” to discuss the issues concerning the future status of blood
availability and utilisation in civil and military emergencies.239
          After the Madrid declaration some cooperative activities in the military
domain have also started. Potentially there was much expertise that NATO could
offer to the dialogue countries. Between September and December 1997 courses on
peacekeeping, military forces and environmental problems, European security
cooperation and civil-military cooperation for civil emergency management were
open to the dialogue countries at the NATO School in Oberammergau. In the same
period a number of seminars, conferences, symposia and visits were organized by the
NATO Military Committee to inform the officers from the dialogue countries on the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs, maritime peace support operations, air
                                                                                                                                                                    
235 NATO Press Release 99 (22) –February 24, 1999- Conference in Valencia on the Mediterranean
Dialogue and the new NATO.
236 Bin, op. cit. note 199, pp.25-26.
237 Ibid.
238 Nordam, op cit note 200, p.28.
239 NATO Press Release 2000 (099) –November 8, 2000- 6th NATO Blood Conference.
59
operations and humanitarian aid, maritime safety, mine warfare and maritime
counter-terrorism. Course held at Oberammergau in 1998 included conventional
arms control implementation.240
          In April 1998, the first NATO Defence College course was opened particularly
for the dialogue countries. The partner countries, with the exception of Morocco that
sent only an observer from the Moroccon embassy in Rome, sent senior military
officers or civilian officials. The aim of the course was to enhance mutual
understanding of each others’ security concerns, promote an understanding of
NATO’s interest and capabilities in the region and offer opportunities for
professional and personal network among the participants.241 The course focused on
current Alliance issues, NATO’s role in European security cooperation and NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue.242
          In 1998, military officers from the dialogue countries agreed to observe PfP
activities in the fields of search and rescue, maritime safety and medical evacuation
and exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief. However, joint
military exercises in the foreseeable future are not expected.243
2.2.3. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the New Strategic Concept
          NATO’s new Strategic Concept updates the previous Strategic Concept
adopted in Rome, in 1991. It takes into account the new security environment in the
post-Cold War era. It referred specifically to the Mediterranean Initiative in
paragraphs 38 and 50. In paragraph 38 it was stressed that security in Europe was
closely related to security in the Mediterranean and that NATO’s Mediterranean
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Dialogue was an integral part of NATO’s cooperative approach to security.
Paragraph 50 emphasizes the value of military-to-military contacts to deepen
NATO’s relationships with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
          The new Strategic Concept has other implications for the Mediterranean and
for the Mediterranean Initiative. It emphasises that risks are multi-dimensional and
difficult to predict. It puts emphasis on the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD.
The geographic scope of the risks has expanded. They are expected from the
periphery of the Alliance. Extensive reference is made to crisis management. The
importance of peace support operations and crisis response operations are underlined.
In this regard, the necessity of enhanced power projection capabilities of the allies
and the alliance is also stressed. There is no reference for a need of a UN mandate for
a possible NATO action in a crisis, which opens the way for Kosovo like operations
in the future. In Kosovo, the Alliance acted without a UN mandate.244
2.2.4. The Perspectives of Member States
          There isn’t full consensus among the allies. European members of NATO see
no real hard security threat from or in the South.245 For European policy-makers
Western Mediterranean, particularly Maghreb, is utmost important.246 The US,
disagreeing with European counterparts, is concerned about hard security threats in
the region.247 Senior US policy-makers think first and foremost Eastern
Mediterranean. They also see the Mediterranean as a stepping stone for the Middle
East and the Persian Gulf. However, the Bosnian crisis has shown how a crisis on the
periphery could spill over and affect important alliance interests as well as how
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difficult it was for the US to remain aloof from a conflict in which the interests of its
key allies are involved. Similarly it would be difficult for the US to ignore North
Africa.248
          In the early 1990s, the US was reluctant to support any cooperative initiative in
the Mediterranean that might endanger the Middle East Peace Process and threaten
the presence of the Sixth Fleet. This reluctance had disappeared by 1995. Dialogue
with the Mediterranean was good for the US provided it did not distract NATO states
from strengthening ties with Central and Eastern Europe.249 The US regards the
dialogue as a contribution to European and Middle Eastern security.250
          With the end of the Cold War the southern European states felt marginalized
within the Alliance because of the great attention given to Central and Eastern
Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union by the US, Canada and North
European allies. Hence, in addition to the security challenges stemming from the
region, southern member states, particularly Spain, backed by Italy and Portugal,
lobbied for the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue. Spain officials had also lobbied for
the creation of MCG.
          Spain, Portugal and Italy proposed to create PfP-type arrangement for the
Mediterranean, including military exercises. The other allies did not welcome this
proposal. Because, such an arrangement could divert the resources from the East.251
There is a feeling among most of the NATO states that the Mediterranean should not
appear to be elevated to the same level of importance as NATO’s relations with
Central and Eastern Europe and with Russia. Indeed the dialogue countries were not
as enthusiastic as the East for a PfP type arrangement.
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          France, in spite of its traditional interest in the Mediterranean is reluctant to
see more involvement of NATO in the region. French officials fear that the dialogue
might harm its relations with North African countries. Hence, they believe in that,
more than the other European countries, the EU is better positioned to play the lead
role in the Mediterranean.
          Greece did not oppose to the dialogue. Athens traditionally enjoyed close
relations with the Arab World. For Greece its perceptions with respect to Turkey is
the most important security subject.
          Turkey which has some historical and cultural ties with some of the dialogue
countries supports the dialogue. In October 1999, Turkey announced that the
dialogue countries could participate in the courses opened in the PfP Center, Ankara,
which will be organized in the period of 2001-2003.
          Canada and the North European members of the Alliance are less enthusiastic
about the Mediterranean Initiative. They did not oppose to the dialogue when they
were assured that it would be cost free, would remain at the diplomatic level and
would not divert NATO’s attention from Central and Eastern Europe.252
2.2.5. The Perspectives of the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries
          NATO has a negative image in the South. The southern Mediterranean
states’ ties with the West have historically been characterized by distrust, conflict
and betrayal.253 With the exception of Israel, these countries endured years of
western colonialism. NATO was established within the framework of Cold War and
was widely perceived as a military instrument of the West to suppress national
liberation movements. The widely held belief in the Arab World that NATO was
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supporting France against Algerians during the war of independence (1954-1962)
reinforced this image.254 The US support for Israel and NATO as a US dominated
organisation was another factor for the bad image.255
        The southern Mediterranean countries do not welcome the western feeling of
religious, cultural and political superiority. They believe that the West sees the
region only as a place to be exploited, defended against or ignored. Indeed to some in
the region, NATO and the West are the main security threat.256
          After the end of the Cold War these negative perceptions have persisted.
During the Cold War NATO was known as a bulwark against the Soviet
expansionism. But the Soviet Union has disappeared from the scene. Then what was
NATO seeking?257 NATO’s expansion of membership was viewed as an attempt to
reinforce Western strategic global control.258
          The huge arms machine, mostly consisting of NATO powers, which was
decisively used in the Gulf War, against a Muslim country, was a real concern for the
Arab World. The passive role of NATO in the early stages of the Bosnian conflict
(1991-1994), where NATO failed to protect Bosnian Muslims from atrocities
committed against them by the Serbs was another serious concern.259 NATO
Secretary-General Willy Claes’ unfortunate statement in February 1995 that Islamic
Fundamentalism had emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to western security since
the collapse of communism has tended to reinforce such impressions.260
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          NATO policy in Kosovo has been more positively perceived in the South. In
Kosovo, NATO forces carried out air operations against the Serbian targets without a
UN mandate to bring the Serbs to the table. However, the Arab World was
apprehensive for the potential for western intervention elsewhere.261
          In general none of the dialogue countries has opposed to the initiative and each
of them regarded it with a variety degree of interest. But they complain about that
they don’t know the aims and the objectives of the dialogue and its ultimate goal.262
They concern about the composition of the group. Why each was chosen to
participate in the dialogue and why others were excluded? Any relation with Israel
by a group of Arab states while other Arab States were excluded is seen as a breach
in Arab solidarity.263 They don’t want to be considered as partners with Israel.264
And why ask the Arab dialogue countries, is the dialogue not more transparent? The
Arab dialogue countries also question to what extent NATO speaks with one voice.
Are countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain really concerned about the
Mediterranean or are they merely seeking to exploit the Mediterranean security
issues in order to bolster their own position in NATO and in the EU?265
          Many dialogue countries feel that NATO is essentially seeking a way to keep
the North African states and their problems at arm’s length rather than genuinely
trying to engage with them.266 They are well aware of the money spent to the
NATO’s east in stark contrast to the Mediterranean Initiative in which almost all the
activities are based on self-funding.267
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          NATO represents not only a strategic organisation, but also a collection of
wealthy western states. Thus involvement in the dialogue is seen as an opportunity to
improve ties, as well as economic relations, with these countries. In other words, the
dialogue is perceived as a way to establish closer relations with the EU.268
          Egypt and Jordan were the most active participants among the Arab states.
They were in favor of more practical cooperation. The Egyptians are keen to
cooperate with NATO in the scientific field, specifically with regard to tackling
desertification. Coordinating work with NATO in the area of counter-terrorism also
attracted Egypt.269 Egyptian officials are also requesting assistance of NATO helping
to demine large streches of territory around El Alamein. But NATO officials regard
the demining issue as merely of economic rather than crucial humanitarian subject.270
          Jordan traditionally enjoyed close relations with the West. The initiative was a
new opportunity in this regard. There wasn’t much public criticism with respect to
the dialogue. The Jordainians want to particularly cooperate with NATO in the fields
of countering drug smuggling, anti-terrorism and prevention of man made disasters.
They lobbied for the inclusion of the Gulf countries, which was not welcomed by the
NATO officials.271
          At the start of the dialogue the Moroccons were very suspicious about the
intentions of the dialogue. For Morocco, national security revolves first and foremost
around the ability to satisfy the needs of the Moroccon people, which include,
transportation, housing, nutrition, health, electrification, civil and criminal justice.
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These are needs that NATO is not particularly well suited to address. However, it
enjoys the dialogue because it is a way to improve relations with the North.272
          Even though Tunisia shares the scepticism of the Moroccons, it is quite happy
to participate in any European sponsored dialogue. It is the leading dialogue country
in North Africa.273 The Tunisians have called for a dialogue based on real
cooperation rather than simply conducting dialogue for the sake of the dialogue.274
          Mauritania is the poorest and most economically and socially backward of the
dialogue countries. It is apprehensive of its powerful northern neighbour, Morocco.
The Mauritanian authorities believe in that participating in the dialogue together with
Morocco will ease their security concerns.275
          Algeria, which participated in the dialogue in March 2000, has expressed its
satisfaction. Fight against terrorism and organised crime is one of the issues that
Algeria wants to cooperate with NATO.276
          Israel is quite pleased to be included in the initiative. Because the other
dialogue countries are Arab and this dialogue is something like a symbol of Israel’s
regional acceptance. Indeed it does not need such a dialogue. It is interested in
cooperating with NATO in areas such as civil emergency and counter terrorism.277
Israeli officials, sensitive to the suspicions and concerns of the Arab participants, are
not likely to assume much more active role in the dialogue, even though variable
geometry is applied.278
          The new Strategic Concept, the expanded definition of NATO’s geographic
scope and the emphasis on non-Article 5 operations, NATO’s willingness to act in
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some cases without a UN mandate and its emphasis on the need to enhance its power
projection capabilities could intensify the concerns in the Middle East and North
Africa about NATO’s purposes and objectives, stimulating fears that NATO is now
more likely to intervene in the region.279
          Both sides of the Mediterranean are fully aware that many of the prevailing
problems in the region are of an economic and social, rather than military, nature.
The Alliance has no means of eliminating these problems. Nevertheless, it is felt that
NATO can contribute to enhance security and stability in the region by dispelling
misconceptions about NATO and building confidence through greater transparency,
dialogue and cooperation.280
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CHAPTER 3: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
          The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU. A
prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open prospective towards
Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as whole.281 But as it was stated
by the European Parliament that: the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the
continuing endemic nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the spread of conflict between
different nationalities and groupings, and the aggregate effects of growing ecological
problems, economic dependence, debt, the continued existence of regimes of various
political shades unsympathetic to the developments of democracy and human rights,
unemployment, the population explosion and increasing migration have greatly
exacerbated the political and social destabilisation of the whole southern and south-
eastern Mediterranean.282
          The challenges faced and even presented by the southern states may not be
military in nature, but the force of the non-military threats to their security and
internal stability carry both immediate and long term implications for their European
neighbours.283 Hence the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the
Barcelona process in 1995 to bring together its 15 member states and 12
Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Greek Cypriot Government, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority).
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3.1. Short Review of the Relations before the Barcelona Process
3.1.1. The Early Agreements in the 1960s
          Almost all of the states in the southern and eastern part of the Mediterranean
were colonies of the European states, particularly of Britain, France and Italy. After
they got their independence in 1950s and in 1960s, even the most nationalist ones,
did not give up their relations with colonist powers.284
          Beginning in the late 1950s, the European Economic Community (EEC) and
several non-member Mediterranean countries began dialogue aimed at formalising
trade relations between north and the south. Between 1960 and 1972 bilateral trade
agreements were signed with Greece, Turkey, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Spain,
Malta, Egypt, Lebanon and Cyprus to solidify the EEC’s commercial presence in the
South.285 The agreements signed with Greece and Turkey were different than the
others, because they offered eventual Community membership. The other agreements
were more limited in nature.
          These early agreements were in general a series of responses to the overtures
made by the non-member Mediterranean states. As result of this, the non-member
states were granted wide range of tariff concessions and quota increases. But the
operation of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s, which was –and still
is- a fundamentally protectionist measure designed to shelter European agribusiness
by tariffs, price supports, quotas and other measures, limited Mediterranean
agricultural exports to the EEC.286 So, most of the privileges given to the non-
member countries included industrial products. But generally the non-member
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Mediterranean countries were not able to manufacture industrial goods that could be
exported to the EEC. As a result of this, the bilateral agreements did not have so
much positive effect for the region.287
3.1.2. The Global Mediterranean Policy
          The Rome treaty did not mention neither of a general Mediterranean policy nor
of a particular initiatives between the EEC and any of the non-member
Mediterranean states. The EEC failed to establish a coherent policy dealing with the
Mediterranean region in the 1960s. It was almost impossible for the Community to
speak with a single voice in many areas, from financial and technical to the
movement of foreign workers to environmental policy.288
          The Community, well aware of the deficiencies of the early agreements,
decided to establish a region wide approach. Particularly France and Italy, the main
producers of the agricultural goods in the Community, took the lead. They were
anxious about the bilateral trade agreements signed by a individual member state and
a non-member Mediterranean state, because such agreements could increase
agricultural concessions in favour of the non-member Mediterranean states and
against France’s and Italy’s agribusiness. As a result of this the Commission
proposed the establishment of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in September
1972. In October 1972, the Heads of States or Government of the Member States
meeting in Paris issued a communique that laid out the goals of the new policy. The
Council of Ministers officially adopted the GMP in November 1972.
          The GMP was the first Mediterranean wide policy. It included four main
objectives:
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1) Free trade in industrial goods between the EEC and the non-member
Mediterranean countries;
2) Limited concessions in agricultural goods;
3) Technical and financial cooperation;
4) Financial aid to the developing countries.289
Initially the proposal envisioned free trade in all industrial products between the EEC
and the more developed non-member Mediterranean countries, notably Spain, Israel,
Malta and Cyprus, by July 1977. Tariff schedules for the other Mediterranean
countries, judged to be less developed, would be reduced over 12 to17 year period. In
the area of agriculture, tariffs on 80 percent of non-member Mediterranean countries’
farm goods to the Community were targeted for reduction, although at varying
rates.290 In contrast to the pure trade agreements signed during the 1960s, the GMP
placed development policy high on its list of goals.291 In this regard initial
cooperation and aid proposals were quite ambitious. The EEC hoped to implement
the GMP by December 1973.292
          But as a result of the break of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 which led
to an oil embargo against the West, the economies of the non-oil producing countries
were thrown into disarray. The unemployment rate increased swiftly. By December
1973, the Council of Ministers abonded the goal of region-wide negotiation. This
was the first retreat from the GMP as it was originally formulated. Instead of
concluding a single, consistent agreement with the non-member Mediterranean states
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as a whole, a series of individual agreements were negotiated over the next several
years.293
          The Community revised its policy further. Although the GMP called for free
trade in industrial goods and indeed abolished tariffs on imports of the non-member
Mediterranean country textiles, the Community began to apply quantitative import
restrictions on these products.294 Due to the recession and the high unemployment
rates a ban on immigration was implemented.295 Financial aid decreased and some
cooperative projects were thwarted because of lack of funds.296
          Southern enlargement of the Community (Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain
(1986)) was another detrimental factor for the GMP. The expansion posed the threat
to the states of the southern Mediterranean that their traditional exports would be
increasingly disadvantaged in the EC markets, given that the new members produced
many of the same goods.297  As a result of this, not only would internal demand be
met by the Community suppliers for many of these products, but the CAP would
assure that this internal production maintained an unbeatable market advantage over
any outside producers.298
          Thus, by 1989 there was a general agreement that Community efforts to assist
the non-member Mediterranean countries proceeded to slowly and had lacked a
coherent plan. Lack of will was also an important reason for the failure in addition to
the oil crisis, recession, insufficient funds and enlargement. The Commission
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admitted that the policies of the GMP had not been successful and that cooperation
policy would have to be redefined.299
3.1.3. The Redirected Mediterranean Policy
          In the 1980s there had been some significant events in the South that could not
be ignored by the Community. The economies of the southern countries, not only the
oil producing but also the oil importing countries, deteriorated due to the fall of the
oil prices. The rapidly growing population combined with the already high
unemployment increased migration towards the North. In that period fundamentalist
movements in the region got stronger.300 With its swelling population, increasing
poverty, political unrest and growing environmental problems, the Mediterranean
was not a region Europe could afford to ignore.301 As result of this, in 1989 the
Community decided to evaluate its Mediterranean policy. The Commission
investigated the current situation and prepared a report.302 In this regard the
Community accepted the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in December
1990.
          The new policy aimed to support the economic reforms already being carried
out and to encourage private sector investment, both from domestic savings and
European direct investment. It called for a greater support for small and medium-
sized enterprises and environmental and regional integration projects. It repeated that
the non-member Mediterranean states should be given better access to European
markets. The new policy emphasized that the Mediterranean countries should
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participate more directly in Community programs in areas such as agriculture,
energy, taxation, business, transport, macro-economic policies, emigration,
population and the environment.
          Horizontal cooperation programs introduced under the RMP were innovative.
In this regard a series of decentralised cooperation schemes between the both sides of
the Mediterranean were launched known as “Med-Programs”. The aim was to
mobilise the groups in all civil societies –local authorities, universities, business and
the media- and to foster contact, understanding and cooperation between them.303
          One of the Med-programs was “Med-URBS” which aimed to form networks
between municipalities and local authorities in Europe and the non-member
Mediterranean countries. “Med-Campus” was designed to strengthen cooperation
between universities and other higher education. “Med-Invest” targeted small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Mediterranean, offering them technical
resources and instruction, as well as the opportunity to network with the other SMEs
in the Community. “Med-Media” was aimed at filmmakers, television, radio and
newspaper journalists, involving them co-productions, training, program exchanges,
seminars and workshops to improve the quality of media. “Med-Migration” was
designed to promote cooperation and partnerships between local communities in
Europe and the non-member Mediterranean countries with respect to the migration
issue.304
          The RMP fell short of expectations. The root cause for the failure was the
recurring free trade dispute between the northern and southern EC member states.
The former led by Britain, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, favoured open
                                                                                                                                                                    
302 Commission of the European Communities, Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy,
report from the Commission to the Council, SEC(89) 1961 final (Brussels, 23 November 1989).
303 Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.133.
304 Ibid., pp.133-134.
75
markets, while the later, notably France, Spain, Greece and Portugal emphasized
financial support and cooperation. Sensing a threat to their own extensive
agricultural sectors, the southern European countries successfully lobbied to prevent
Mediterranean farm imports. The northern countries in turn successfully lobbied to
prevent substantially increased aid package reaching the region.305
          As a result of this, the non-member Mediterranean countries were given free
access to the EC market for industrial goods and modestly improved access for
agricultural products. However the Community was still reluctant to liberalise its
agriculture and textile sectors.306
          The financial aid even though it was nearly three times as much as funding
reached the region in the period of 1987-1992 was not sufficient. Some ECU 4.405
billion would be allocated to the non-member Mediterranean states for the period
1992-1996. Of this total, ECU 3.1 billion would be in the form of European
Investment Bank (EIB) loans, the remainder in grants. The aid package to the
Mediterranean was worth only ECU 2.4 per capita per year compared to ECU 6.8 per
capita per year for Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC).307
          The end of the Cold War harmed the non-member Mediterranean states
prospects as much as it helped them. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, they seemed
less attractive for the investors.308 Funds, public and private, flowed eastwards from
the member states as investors discovered a vast source of skilled, low-wage
workers, both culturally and geographically closer to themselves than the inhabitants
                                                          
305 Ibid., pp. 140-141
306 Ibid., p. 164.
307 Alfred Tovias, “The Euro-Mediterranean Policies under Pressure,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol:2,
p.13
308 Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.164.
76
of the Mediterranean. Now the Mediterranean countries would have to compete
head-to-head with the CEECs.309
          The emergence of single market in Europe in January 1993 had also a negative
effect for the non-member Mediterranean countries. The removal of internal barriers
would result in price and cost savings for European producers and lower priced
European goods would be more competitive against some Mediterranean imports. In
short, the RMP did not have significant positive effect for the region. The economies
of many non-member states faltered the economic gap between the north and the
south of the Mediterranean increased and immigration pressures continued to
build.310
3.2. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
3.2.1. The Origins of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
          By 1992 the RMP was under increasing criticism from non-member
Mediterranean states on the grounds that it was not doing enough.311 Hence the
European Council in Lisbon in June 1992 called for an expansion of relations with
countries south of Europe. In particular it emphasized that a Euro-Maghreb
“partnership” should be established which would encompass political and security
dialogue, cooperation in social and cultural fields, increased financial and technical
cooperation and ultimately a free trade area.312 The Maghreb countries welcomed the
Community’s proposal for a “partnership” and freer markets. But the other non-
member Mediterranean countries highly criticised the idea. The continued problems
with Libya –which was accused of bombing a aircraft over Lockerbie-, and the
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worsening crises in Algeria hindered the cultivation of an exclusively EU-Maghreb
axis.313
          Due to the progress in the peace process, the Commission to underscore the
Community’s commitment to the process and to remind that Europe, too, had an
important role to play in the Middle East issued a communication in September
1993. In this paper it was suggested that the development of the regional economic
cooperation could be powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict and in this
regard, the Commission proposed a “free trade area” among EU, Israel and Mashreq
countries. Some horizontal cooperation projects were also envisioned and the
benefits of cooperation in scientific and cultural fields were underscored. It declared
that a partnership should be offered to Israel and Mashreq countries similar to that
offered to Maghreb.314 Like Euro-Maghreb Partnership, the idea of an Euro-Mashreq
Partnership was abandoned in the mid-1990, in favor of a generalised policy
applicable to the entire Mediterranean basin.315
          In June 1994, the European Council in Corfu instructed the Commission to
prepare an upgraded European strategy towards the Mediterranean region. In
response, on October 1994, the Commission released a communication and proposed
that a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership –rather than a more restricted Euro-Maghreb
or Euro-Mashreq partnership- be encouraged. It offered a threefold approach. First, a
political and security component called upon the non-member Mediterranean
countries to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Second, an
economic and financial component called a process of progressive establishment of
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free trade supported by substantial financial aid. Third, a social, cultural and
humanitarian part called for cooperation in a variety of fields. It was also suggested
that ECU 5.5 billion be offered to support the EU’s Mediterranean policy for the
period 1995 to 1999. Finally the Commission called for a ministerial conference in
1995 between the EU member states and the non-member Mediterranean states to set
forth guidelines for further cooperation measures.316
          In December 1994, the European Council in Essen approved the Commission’s
proposals and decided to hold a conference in Barcelona to discuss political,
economic, financial, human, societal and security issues related to the
Mediterranean.317
          The Council of Ministers, meeting in Luxemburg in June 1995 proposed to
decrease the amount of the financial aid to ECU 3.5 billion. Germany and Britain had
a great influence on this proposal. They were in favor of aid to CEEC rather than the
Mediterranean states. But in the heads of state and government meeting in Cannes,
later that month, the amount was increased to ECU 4.685 billion, to which loans and
other financing provided by the EIB would be later added. France and Spain were the
main supporters of this decision. But the CEEC received 6.7 billion or about twice as
much as the Mediterranean states in per capita in the same term.318
          There were also disagreements over the composition of the participants. The
first stumbling block was the attitude of Syria and Lebanon who were not very
willing to participate in a ministerial meeting with Israel. Another country to a lesser
degree and for different reasons, raised doubts about attending the conference was
                                                                                                                                                                    
315 Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op.cit. note 23, pp.139-140.
316 Commission of the European Communities, Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the
European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament, COM(94)427 final (Brussels, 19 October 1994).
317 European Council, Conclusions of the Session of the European Council of Essen, 9-10 December
1994.
318 Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, op. cit. note 23, p.219.
79
Morocco. Rabat’s attitude was based on a wish to maintain its privileged relations
with the EU. All these problems were solved by negotiations and these countries
accepted to attend. Libya requested to participate in the conference and the Arab
World insisted on the inclusion of Libya. But the majority of the EU countries,
particularly France and Britain, vetoed the idea. Eventually Libya withdrew its
request. The US, Russia and the Gulf countries showed an interest in the event.  The
US wanted to participate fully, whereas Russia requested observer status. However
only observer status was given to the US.319
3.2.2. The Barcelona Process
          In November 1995, at the conference organized by the Spanish presidency of
EU in Barcelona, the fifteen members of the Union came together with the twelve
non-member Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Declaration issued at the end
of the conference announced that the objective was to turn the Mediterranean region
into “an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and
prosperity.”320 The declaration called for an establishment of a comprehensive
partnership among the participants in three different –so called- baskets:
1) The political and security partnership;
2) The economic and financial partnership;
3) The partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.
It was the most ambitious, comprehensive, coherent cooperation framework in the
region. By combining all three chapters into one comprehensive policy, it
acknowledged that financial, economic, cultural and security issues can not be
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effectively tackled separately.321 It assumed that these aspects are inseparable,
interdependent: there can not be progress in one of these aspects that is not based on
progress in the others.322 It was strongly emphasized that stability in the
Mediterranean region was closely linked to its economic and social development.323
          Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the EMP was established, consisting of
officials from the EU troika (the current, previous and next council presidencies) and
from all twelve southern Mediterranean countries. It was decided that the committee
should meet regularly (every three months) and report to the foreign ministers. It was
also decided that the foreign ministers of all partner countries would meet
periodically to review the progress in implementing the principles of the Barcelona
Declaration and to agree on actions that would promote the objectives. This would
lead to intergovernmental discussions on issues such as water resources, energy
policy, industry, tourism and environment. This was a substantial advance compared
to the earlier European policies and initiatives, which contained no precise follow-up
provisions and were dependent on constant ministerial action.324 More informal
gatherings of NGOs representing civil society were encouraged. The European
Parliament also initiated contacts with deputies of Mediterranean-partner assemblies
and thereby launched interparliamentary dialogue.325
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3.2.2.1. The Political and Security Partnership
          The first chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative is titled:
“Political and Security Partnership: Establishing an area of Peace and Stability.” The
chapter points out that the parties will
• act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights;
• develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems;
• promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat
manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia;
• respect the equal rights of people and their right to self-determination;
• respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;
• respect their sovereign equality;
• refrain from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of
another party;
• settle their disputes by peaceful means;
• refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence
requirements;
• promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favor of nuclear,
chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and
compliance with a combination of international and regional non-
proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such
as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT;
• promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among
themselves and support processes aimed stability, security, prosperity and
regional and subregional cooperation;
82
• strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism;
• fight against the expansion and the diversification of organized crime and
combat the drug problems;
• consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be
taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area peace and
stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of
establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.326
          The chapter also stipulated that one aim was to secure “a mutually and
effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of WMD, nuclear, chemical and
biological and their delivery means.”
          There were/are serious disagreements over the issues written in the security
chapter. That is why there are generally wage terms. Europeans were critisized by the
southern partners that they were imposing their values on the Arab Countries.327
          The southern Mediterranean regimes tend to consider EU insistence on the
achievement of political reforms, human rights and the rule of law as interference to
their domestic affairs.328 The Arab states remain, as a whole, fundamentally
suspicious of and even hostile to any form of Western intervention, especially when
it occurs in the name of international law or the right of intervention. The West is
accused of seeking new ways to impose its hegemony while hiding behind the
pretext of democratic principles and their universality.329 The ruling elites claim that
democracy is a western model and not suitable for other societies.
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          On the other side, the Europeans insist on the interdependence between
security and democracy, believing in that democratic states make peaceful
neighbours, as they have experienced in their own modern history.330
          The distinction between the terrorist groups and those fighting for liberation
and independence was also a difficult subject. Syria insisted on linking the right to
self- determination to the legitimate right to fight against territorial occupiers. Israel,
for its part, did not agree with the reference to self-determination to territorial
integrity because of their significance for Southern Lebanon and the Palestinians. On
the fight against terrorism, Syria’s wish to make distinction regarding the struggle
against the occupiers of a territory was not included.331
          The major differences of opinion between the Arab states and Israel
concerning the proliferation of WMD was also an important stumbling block.
“Although the Barcelona declaration referred to the elimination of WMD from the
Middle East, it tended to focus on chemical and biological weapons, leaving Israeli
nuclear arsenal untouched” says an Egyptian analyst.332
          There is a strong feeling among the Arab states that the EU is giving Israel
preferential treatment. Israeli nuclear program has never been identified as a danger
by the Western power. But the nuclear ambitions of the Arab countries and Iran
(even though these countries signed the NPT) have always been condemned.333
          Arab states wanted more explicit statements with respect to the elimination of
the Israeli nuclear weapons, which was unacceptable for Israeli officials because of
the reasons mentioned in the first chapter. And also without the active involvement
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of the US and without the inclusion of Libya, Iran and Iraq, Israel rejects to discuss
the issue to make a significant step towards denuclearisation of the region. The
presence of operational nuclear weapons in Israel complicates the efforts to promote
regional cooperative security measures. Because Israeli stance is taken by the Arab
states and Iran to pursue their own programs of WMD.334
          The Arab World is also concerned about the nuclear warheads in Europe. They
want France and Britain to fulfil their obligations under the NPT, such as the gradual
reduction of their nuclear capabilities and the transfer of nuclear technology to the
developing countries for peaceful purposes. They would prefer to see the
Mediterranean region an area of free of WMD.335 Because of their military
superiority, the countries in the north fuel the fears of those in the south.336 The Arab
World critisize the declaration in that it has not mentioned the military power gap
between the North and the South. They suspect that Europe has not ruled out the use
of force if it is necessary to achieve European goals.337
          Hence the conference began with a series of problems still to be resolved. The
problems of the Middle East were much in the air: there were the questions of the
problem of non-proliferation, on the hand, and the controversy about terrorism and
the fight for self-determination, on the other. The closing ceremony was delayed by
more than two hours because of the difficulties encountered in reaching a consensus
on these issues.338 Finally, the Spanish presidency decided to be firm. With the
backing of the all the EU partners, the Spain foreign minister presented, in the form
of an ultimatum, the text that was adopted finally. Any country that would not accept
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it would bear the responsibility for the failure of the conference. In particular, both
Israel and Syria, who disagreed on some points, thus ended up by accepting the
text.339
          Because of the difficulties experienced over political and security questions, it
is little surprising that the section of the work program relating to this basket, is the
shortest. There are no precise statements about how the principles adopted in this
section would be implemented.340 However, all the parties have continued political
dialogue, even during the periods of stalemate in the Middle East peace process,
within the Barcelona framework. It was the only political multilateral forum in which
representatives of Syria and Lebanon regularly participated in talks with their
counterparts from Israel.341
          The failure of the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference which
took place in Malta in April 1997 demonstrated that while the success of the EMP
was dependent upon the advancement of the peace process, the EMP had had very
little, if any at all, on the Middle East peace process.342
          The main task at the ministerial meeting in Malta was for the member states to
elaborate more specifically on implementation of the partnership program and to set
up short-term action plans so that tangible cooperative ventures could commence. At
the top of the agenda was the endorsement of, or at least elaboration, of a security
charter that would lay the foundations for the peaceful resolution of crisis situations
and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area. Such a charter would enable
the partners to identify the factors of friction and tension in the Euro-Mediterranean
area and to carry out an assessment of how such destabilising focal points can be
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managed.343 In short, the main purpose was to institutionalise the political dialogue
and set up concrete mechanisms to address security and stability questions relevant
to the region.
          But the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli relations since the election of Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1996 prevented any progress. The
meeting failed to agree to guidelines and principles for this charter. The Arab side
indicated that because of current difficulties in the peace process the charter could
not be adopted. Arab delegates could see little sense in agreeing a charter that sought
to prevent future conflicts but avoided tackling ongoing disputes.344 Arab
representatives also wanted the charter to focus on issues such as proliferation of
WMD, in particular the question of Israeli nuclear weapons and socioeconomic
problems including the issues of migration and debt.345
          However the senior officials responsible for the political and security dialogue
have met regularly, at least four times a year, since 1995 to discuss the drafting of the
charter. In the third ministerial meeting in Stuttgart, foreign ministers agreed on the
guidelines for the charter and that the text of the charter itself should be ready at their
next formal meeting in Marsellies in November 2000. It was also agreed in Stuttgart
that the charter would be formally adopted when political circumstances allow. The
main elements of the guidelines for the charter were:
• politically not legally binding,
• rule of consensus for decision making,
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• focus on political and security issues but cover also economic, social,
cultural and human affairs in so far as they affect political and security
issues,
• promotion of human rights, democracy, tolerance and mutual
understanding,
• cooperation on organised crime, terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD,
• conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction.346
Negotiation of the charter proceeded in the run-up to the Marsellies conference in
November 2000. However, in view of deterioration of the political climate in the
region, ministers at Marsellies therefore welcomed the work done so far but agreed
to defer adoption of any text.347
          In spite of the endemic problems of the region, senior official and ad hoc
meetings on political and security questions decided some cooperative activities.
Among them are some “partnership building measures” designed to create trust and
build confidence, including a series of information and training seminars for Euro-
Mediterranean diplomats held semi-annually in Malta and the Euro-Mediterranean
network of foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSCo). These efforts are reinforced by
cooperation among civil protection services for disaster management.348
          The Malta Seminars began in October 1996. These four-day seminars are
managed by the Mediterranean Academy for diplomatic studies in Malta and with
close cooperation with the European Commission, and are financed by the EU. The
seminars aim to provide the participants with regular and updated information as
well as issues for discussion on the three chapters of the Barcelona Process. In
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particular, this information provides an account of the developments undergone on
these various aspects, between each session. Moreover, these seminars allow the
establishment of informal contacts between the participants and the progressive
creation of a network of Euro-Mediterranean diplomats.349
          Also a network of international affairs and strategic studies institutes in the
region, known as EuroMeSCo, has been established in June 1996 under the
coordination of the Lisbon Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEI). The network includes
34 member institutes and 7 observers. It contributes to the dialogue between civil
societies on crucial topics of the partnership and supports the work of senior officials
as necessary. Two Working Parties were formed: on political and security
cooperation, which includes the issues of democratisation, social changes and the
economic aspects of security. The second Working Party deals with confidence
building measures, disarmament and conflict prevention and the all the aspects of the
preventive diplomacy. Several meetings of the working parties and two informal
joint meetings with senior officials were held which permitted the development of
the debate on the political dialogue. Also annual conferences are organised by the
EuroMeSCo.350
          The project for cooperation between the civil protection organisations of the 27
partners can be considered under the “partnership building measures”. It aims at the
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of prevention, of reduction and of
management of natural and man made disasters. It deals with the major generic risks
which represents the greatest dangers in terms of massive loss of lives and of
property (earthquakes, floods, forest and industrial fires…).351
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          The cooperation network between civil protection services of the 27 partners
concentrates on:
• training and information,
• exchange of experts,
• network of civil protection schools,
• technical assistance,
• awareness-raising and the education of citizens.
By developing the exchange of experience, cooperation and training between the
European and Mediterranean civil protection authorities, the project aims at
contributing to political confidence within the partnership.352
          Even though the initiative was able to bring together Israel and Syria to the
same table, it appears that there will be no dramatic progress in the political-security
chapter of the Barcelona Process while serious problems remain in the Middle
East.353
3.2.2.2. The Economic and Financial Partnership
          Although the EU is concerned primarily with political stability, it does not
necessarily seek to achieve it through political dialogue. Political, social and cultural
objectives, including political stability, are primarily sought through economic
growth, which is itself supposed to flow from policies of free trade and economic
liberalization.354 Hence, the second chapter entitled “Economic and Financial
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Partnership” is regarded as the hard of the declaration and the engine of the
process.355
          The central economic objective is the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free
Trade Zone (FTZ) by 2010 achieved by the progressive dismantlement of tariffs.356 It
is expected that by this way economic and social development of the south will be
achieved and an area of shared prosperity will be created. And this shared prosperity
will bring about peace, stability and security to the whole region. The logic behind
this argument is based on the predicted impact that the actual announcement of the
creation of FTZ and economic liberalization may have on foreign investors –a
phenomenon which has been observed during the implementation of other FTZs.357
          Helped by low wages, growth in investment would increase export revenues
and improve the trade balance. Export revenues would, in turn, contribute to the
reduction of external debt, even though the instruments of the partnership fail to
address this issue in detail. Investments would also lead to job creation, productivity
and, more generally, to an increase in revenues and an improvement in the standard
of living, which would reduce migration flows significantly. On the political level,
this new prosperity could reinforce the stability of the countries concerned. This
stability and prosperity could facilitate political liberalization and transition to
democracy. In turn this would contribute to the stability of the EU.358
          This is to be achieve by means of the Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreements negotiated between the EU and 9 out of the 12 Mediterranean partners,
together with free trade agreements between the partners themselves.359 Negotiations
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for agreements have been concluded between the Union and Tunisia, Israel,
Morocco, Jordan and Palestinian Authority. All these agreements have been ratified
and with the exception the Jordanian agreement are in force. Negotiations with Egypt
have been concluded, but the agreement waits to be signed; negotiations are still
under way with Lebanon, Algeria and Syria.360
          Even though the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreements governing bilateral relations vary from one Mediterranean partner to the
other, they have certain aspects in common:
• the establishment of free trade area over a transitional period, which may
last up to 12 years from the date of the entry into force of the agreement,
• custom duties on EU exports of industrial products to the partner are to be
eliminated gradually during the transitional period, partners’ exports of
theses products already have duty free access  to the EU;
• economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors;
• the adjustment provisions relating to competition, state aids and
monopolies;
• the gradual liberalization of arrangements on public procurement;
• the gradual liberalization of trade in services;
• the maintenance of high level of protection of intellectual property rights;
• political dialogue;
• respect for human rights and democracy;
• cooperation relating to social affairs and migration;
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• cultural cooperation.361
          With the other three partners Turkey, Greek Cypriot Government and Malta,
relations are governed by pre-existing association agreements. As a result of
Turkey’s association agreement, a customs union with the EU entered into force on 1
January 1996. With Greek Cypriot Government, a customs union is planned to be
established in 2001-2002.
          Because dismantling customs union requires substantial reform to the fiscal,
economic and industrial sectors, the EU aims to provide support to these economic
reforms in the public and private sector by the MEDA program. It is the main
financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership. It is entirely made up of grants, as opposed to the complementary
financial support given by the European Investment Bank (EIB) which comes in the
form of repayable loans. For the period 1995 to 1999 MEDA accounted for ECU
3.435 billion out of the total funds of ECU 4.685 billion allocated to the
Mediterranean partners. However several difficulties have led to a low disbursement
rate (26% ECU 890 million at the end of 1999).362
          Some 86 % of the budgetary resources allocated to MEDA are channelled
bilaterally to 9 Mediterranean partners (all but Greek Cypriot Government, Israel and
Malta due to their relatively high GDP). The other 14 % of the resources are devoted
to regional activities from which all the partners are eligible to benefit.363
          The priorities for MEDA resources at the bilateral level are support to
economic transition, support for the creation of an environment favorable to the
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development of the private sector, activities in the social sector (health, education,
insurance etc.) which aim to support the socio-economic balance in the partner
countries and to mitigate the short term negative effects of economic transition,
support for rural development programs, activities in environment.364
          The regional programs are expected to complement and reinforce the bilateral
programs in all three domains of the Barcelona Declaration. Priority has been given
to industrial cooperation, environment, water, energy, transport and the information
society.365 EuroMeSCo, the Malta Seminars, cooperation between the civil protection
services and all of the Med-Programs are financed by the MEDA funds. For 2000-
2006 MEDA is endowed with ECU 5.350 billion.366
          Nevertheless, all of the dimensions of the EMP, the economic ones were the
most severely and widely criticised, not only by the Arabs but also by some of the
European analysts. They argue that there is no guarantee that free trade and
liberalization recommended under the EU’s new Mediterranean policy will have the
anticipated effects.367
          It is a FTZ between one country on the one hand and a group of countries on
the other; between economies with unequal level of development; between
economies with unequal level of mutual protection. They argue that these
characteristics mean that Mediterranean FTZ does not fit into the classic pattern of
FTZ creation in which two or more countries with comparable levels of development
and protection agree on the modalities of trade barrier removal. The implementation
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of the FTZ in the Barcelona context is therefore characterised by obvious
asymmetry.368
          The critics claim that the creation of the FTZ by removing the trade barriers
directed against European products, while restricting the southern states agricultural
export in which they are in advantageous position in comparison to the North to
some extent and preventing of freedom of movement of people can not serve for the
interest of the southern states. The FTZ established by opening of southern markets
to northern products may result in, instead of flow of FDI, disinvestment in the
countries concerned.369 Most of the local industries can not compete with European
ones and this will result in the destruction of indigenous industrial production.370 A
study has predicted that the increased competition could see some 2000 local
Tunisian companies go into bankruptcy and the status of a further 2000 would be
questionable without sufficient support during the transition period.371 This will not
contribute to the creation of new jobs. Another study suggests that the partnership
may entail loss of up to 40 percent of existing jobs.372
          Also the custom revenue will be reduced significantly which constitutes an
important source for the states. To compensate this reduction they can increase
taxation which will lead to demand control and thus to restrictions on investment,
production and employment.373
          They also critisize that the question of the foreign debt of non-member
Mediterranean states are not sufficiently dealt with in the Euro-Mediterranean
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process.374 Although the amuont of the economic aid promised to the Mediterranean
countries was the largest in the history of EU-Mediterranean relations, the critics
contended that such aid, if compared with was has been promised to Eastern Europe,
was insufficient.375 Funds released by the EU within the framework of the
partnership in 1995-1999 only amounted to less than $100 million per country per
year, in addition to the loans granted by the EIB and to bilateral aid. It is argued that
this amount of aid can not finance major structural transformations in the southern
Mediterranean states.376 However access to the market is more important for the
countries of the south than is the growth of financial aid through MEDA program.377
          If the FTZ will be successful, it will result in one of the largest free trade area
in the world, covering 600 to 800 million inhabitants of some 30-40 countries.
Although free trade in itself is likely to increase the level of trade between the
northern and southern countries of the Mediterranean, there is nothing to guarantee
that this will necessarily reduce the wide level of economic disparities that currently
exist.378
          A FTZ can be beneficial if only mobilizes a substantial flow of FDI to the
south. Without a substantial increase in investment, there is little hope that southern
Mediterranean countries will be able to increase substantially their export revenues
and thus repay their public debt.379 But the region is unattractive to investors, no
amount of tariff reduction can stimulate new capital flows and employment
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creation.380 The investors don’t want to risk their money without peace, stability and
security in the individual states and the region as a whole.
          No free trade agreements have been concluded among the Mediterranean
partners and without a real peace in the chronic dispute such agreements are not
expected. Just the association agreements are not enough to attract investors.381
Because the region does not offer a new economic opportunity when compared to
other parts of the World. Fiscal, administrative and legal reforms as well as
deregulation of public services are in slow process which makes the region more
nuisance.382
          Without substantial outside support, without free access of agricultural
products and without free movement of people, southern Mediterranean states seem
unlikely to be able to improve their conditions. The social situation can worsen and
this in turn can ignite problems.
3.2.2.3. Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs
           The third chapter, which complements the first one, puts forth the idea that the
countries concerned should work to encourage the participation of civil society in the
EMP. Participation would involve joint efforts in education and training; social
development; policies designed to reduce migratory pressures; the fight against drug
trafficking, terrorism and international crime; judicial cooperation; the fight against
racism and xenophobia; and a campaign against corruption.383
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          Further ideas that have been proposed include joint efforts with regard to
culture, media, health policy and the promotion of exchanges and development of
contact among young people in the framework of decentaralized cooperation
programs. Throughout the process there has been an emphasis on the importance of
dialogue between cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological
levels, deemed as an essential factor bringing people closer, promoting
understanding between them and improving their perception of one another.384
          In this regard new “Med-Programs” were launched: the Euromed-Heritage
Program aimed at the preservation and the development of the Euro-Mediterranean
cultural heritage.385 The Euromed Audiovisual Program brings together European
and Mediterranean operators in the audiovisual sector. This program aims to
contribute to the regional projects in the fields of radio, television, and cinema,
particularly in the following areas: preservation of archives, production and co-
production support, support to broadcasting/distribution and circulation of
audiovisual products.386
          The Euromed-Youth aims to improve mutual comprehension and cohesion
between young people across the Mediterranean basin, based on and committed to
mutual respect, tolerance and dialogue between the various cultures. Furthermore it
aims at increasing the importance of youth organisations, developing active
citizenship of young people and especially young women and promoting the
exchange of information, experience and expertise between youth organisations.387
          Med-Techno seeks to promote the use of efficient technologies in the field of
treatment and re-use of waste water and the use of renewable energy sources. It
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involves the creation of networks of scientists, technicians, firms, local
administrations and public authorities, as well as NGOs concerned with research and
technological development.388 Med-Avicenne supports research institutes, promotes
science and technology cooperation and funds joint research programs in the EU and
the non-member Mediterranean countries.389
          In addition the EU has given particular consideration to promoting human
rights and democracy in the Mediterranean partners. MEDA Democracy, a program
launched in 1996 and intended to promote human rights in the twelve Mediterranean
partners has so far financed 171 operations which aimed to promote democracy, the
rule of law, freedom of expression and the protection of vulnerable groups (woman,
youth).390
          Immediately after the Barcelona Conference, a Euro-Mediterranean Civil
Forum gathered some 1200 European and Mediterranean social, economic and
cultural agents to establish links between societies across Mediterranean. The second
Civil Forum devoted to cultural issues in 1997 brought together major
representatives civil society as well as European and Mediterranean institutions.391 In
order to develop the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process, a Euro-Med
Parliamentary Forum was held in Brussels in October 1998, for the first time
bringing together more than a hundred parliamentarians from all over the EU and the
Mediterranean.392
          In European circles it is widely believed in that bottom-up approaches are
better than the state led policies for effective reforms. Cooperation among civil
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societies is considered an essential element of democratic reforms. Hence, the
programs are launched as an instrument to support civil societies and cooperation
among them, and ultimately to encourage democratization in the non-member
Mediterranean countries.393 These programs are expected, at least, to serve as a series
of confidence building measures.
          However, the future success of these programs is highly questionable. Because
the present socio-political context of the most of the non-member Mediterranean
countries seems inappropriate for the proliferation of initiatives of civil society
institutions.394 Civil society culture in the south is not developed as much as that of
the North. Radical Islamic movements regard civil society initiatives as part of
western civilization and intrinsically corrupt. They oppose the development of them.
The dominance of such visions of society affects the participation of civil society
organizations in decentralized networks with European partners. Such cooperations
are regarded as leading to “westernisation”.395
          Also the regimes are suspicious of the cultural and social basket of the EMP,
because this encourages direct contacts with independent groups and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) between the two shores of the Mediterranean.
Governments find it difficult to control and fear that flow of information will presage
a wave of disaffection and potential dissidence.396 In the most of the non-member
Mediterranean countries the relations between civil society and the state are
characterized by reciprocal suspicion and/or confusion. Even when tolerated, most
organizations are closely controlled by the state.397
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          Israel was also doubtful about the decentralized programs. Because it was
sensitive to the impression that Barcelona’s cultural basket was essentially about
Euro-Islamic dialogue.398 Because of the reasons mentioned the results of the Euro-
Mediterranean decentralized cooperation programs will be more modest than
intended by those who designed them.399
          Overall, the EU, because of its comprehensive approach to the problems in the
region and because of its economic power, is the best institution that can provide
security and stability in the Mediterranean region. It can deal with the root causes of
the problems that are mainly economic. People to people contacts can contribute to
alleviating the misperceptions between the northern and southern shores of the
Mediterranean. Progress on the second and the third basket can pave the way for the
first one. But, in addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, lack of political will, lack of
coherence among the member states, reluctance to waste more money slow down the
process.
3.3. The WEU’s Mediterranean Dialogue
          The WEU is also involved in Mediterranean cooperation. In the Petersberg
Declaration of June 1992, the WEU Council entrusted the presidency and secretariat
to develop ties with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The discussions –later extended
to Egypt, Mauritania, Israel and Jordan- have as their main purpose the exchange of
views on security and defence issues affecting the Mediterranean region.400
          Dialogue takes place between the WEU representatives and officials and
Mediterranean partner ambassadors in Brussels. Political talks are supported by a
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series of activities, including seminars on Mediterranean security, occasional
briefings by the WEU military staff and planing cells, information seminars
involving military staff from WEU and Mediterranean partner countries and visits to
WEU satellite center.401
      In these discussions WEU officials also talk of the significance for the
Mediterranean of WEU’s so called Petersberg tasks –humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping missions and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including
peacemaking. The ambassadors are also briefed on the latest WEU Ministerial
Meeting. Also the WEU’s Institute for security Studies based in Paris organize an
annual Mediterranean seminar that is attended by representatives the non-WEU
Mediterranean countries. The latest was on “The future of the Euro-Mediterranean
Security Dialogue”, in March 2000.402
          Overall little progress has been achieved in the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue.
There are several reasons for that. As in the case of the NATO and the EU, there
were divisions in WEU, between the southern and northern members who were more
in favor of increasing ties with the central and eastern European states. Lack of solid
goals and practical cooperation were the other reasons.403 The establishment of the
European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Forces
(EUROMARFOR) was the another one.
          The announcement of the establishment of the forces was made at the WEU
Council of Ministers meeting in Lisbon in May 1995. These forces were answerable
to WEU. They consisted of units provided by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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Other WEU members could join if the four founding members agree.404 These were
to be nonstanding forces.  EUROFOR would be a rapid reaction force of ten to
fifteen thousand troops and EUROMARFOR would be a joint naval force.405
           Both forces could be deployed to implement the so-called Petersberg tasks. In
1996 Euroforces were declared operational. EUROFOR was allocated a headquarters
in Florence with a multinational staff working on planning and eventual command
and control. The use of either of the Euroforces would need the consent of all four
contributing states. They could be called upon by WEU or by other bodies such as
NATO, the OSCE or the UN.406
          The Arab World viewed the creation of these forces with considerable
suspicion and was quick to voice their objections in November 1996, when the
EUROFOR headquarter opened in Florence. The Petersberg tasks assigned to these
forces created uncertainty, especially the peace enforcement component has not
sufficiently been understood.407  Egyptian President Mubarek commented: “the issue
needs explanations,” and added “ I fear that it opens the way to interference in other
states’ internal affairs.408 An Arab Analyst said that the European policy of building
forces for the purpose of military intervention in the southern Mediterranean “has no
future in the Mediterranean region. It will not be accepted by the public opinion in
the area”.409 There is a general Arab concerns that these forces might be used as
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instrument to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states.410 The Arab policy
makers and military officials ask, “how would EU feel if the Arab countries created a
force equivalent to Euroforces to be deployed in the Mediterranean?”411
          The sharp Arab reaction to the establishment of the Euroforces underscores the
importance of providing adequate information and properly laying the groundwork
for Western initiatives in the region.412  The Europeans should pay special attention
to transparency in developments concerning their military attempts. This could be
done through better communication and plans, in particular regarding military
doctrines and formation.413 Later on, in 1997, being aware of this misunderstanding,
the member states of the Euroforces have said that they are prepared to implement
actions in cooperation with other Mediterranean countries, particularly those which
maintain a dialogue with the WEU.414
          A major problem for WEU in general was the uncertainty with regard to the
future of the WEU-EU relationship. Naturally this had serious implications for the
WEU Mediterranean Dialogue. Just before the Barcelona Conference, the WEU
officials stressed that WEU had to deal with military aspects while the EU had to
focus on the other aspects.415 This was not welcomed by the EU officials who
favored comprehensive approach to the problems in the region. Indeed, WEU was
not invited to the Barcelona Conference. Apparently, when EU delegations visit non-
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WEU Mediterranean countries, they do not include WEU officials in their ranks as
participants or observers.416
          Now, European leaders agreed to transfer the essential functions of the WEU
to the EU. This transfer eventually will lead to the termination of the WEU as an
independent institution. Elements of the dialogue are likely to be incorporated in the
EU’s Barcelona Process.417 Even though it is not clear how the Mediterranean
dimension of the WEU will be subsumed into the EU, the incorporation might be
beneficial for the Barcelona Process. The WEU officials, who gained experience
throughout the dialogue on the military issues and well informed on the sensitiveness
of the non-WEU Mediterranean states, can contribute to the security basket of the
Barcelona Process. WEU can also contribute to the process by sharing its experience
and knowledge on joint operations concerning humanitarian tasks, assistance to
populations in time of crisis or other emergency situations such as search and rescue,
evacuation, maritime policing, protection of sea lines and merchant shipping logistic
and medical support or minesweeping418 and, by this way paving the way for
practical cooperation among the militaries of the northern and the southern states.
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CHAPTER 4: The Mediterranean Dimension of the OSCE
4.1. A Short Review of the Helsinki Process and the OSCE Today
          The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  (OSCE) is a
security organization whose 55 participating states span the geographical area from
Vancouver to Vladivostok. In its region it is the primary instrument for early
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation.419
          Since its inception, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) and now the OSCE has taken a broad and comprehensive view of
security.420 That is to say, that all questions related to security are considered in their
entirety and comprise all aspects relating to politico-military issues (including
confidence and security building measures and arms control), as well as the
economic and the human dimensions.421 Furthermore various aspects of security are
seen as interconnected and interdependent – security is regarded as indivisible.422
          The CSCE formally opened in Helsinki in 1973. Experts from the 35
participating states engaged in what amounted to the first ever-multilateral East-West
negotiation process; the end result was the CSCE Final Act.
          The Helsinki Final Act encompassed three main sets of recommendations,
commonly referred to as “baskets”:
1. Questions relating to security in Europe;
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2. Cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment;
3. Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.
          The first basket laid out fundamental principles that guide the relations
between the participating states which were:
1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. Inviolability of frontiers;
4. Territorial integrity of states;
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs;
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of
thought, conscience, religion or belief;
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. Cooperation among states;
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.
And it was the first time that the CBMs received considerable international
attention.423
          The CBMs document in the Helsinki Final Act, the first generation of politico-
military CBMs, called for a set of voluntary measures that consisted of voluntary
prior notification of (21 days) of major manoeuvres, major military movements and
the invitation of observers to major military manoeuvres. These information
measures were to create more openness and transparency in order to reduce fears of
surprise attack resulting from major manoeuvres.424
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          After Helsinki, the dialogue continued and further steps were agreed in
Stockholm in 1986 where the further elaboration of notification and invitation to
military activities resulted in obligatory CSBMs.425 A major breakthrough was the
acceptance by the USSR, for the first time, of on site inspection on its territory with
no right of refusal.426 In the Vienna Document 1990, agreement was reached for an
exchange of military information of land and airforces.427
          The Vienna Document 1994 urges states to demonstrate transparency and
predicability in their military activities by setting out parameters for annual exchange
of military information, information on plans for the deployment of major weapon
and equipment systems and exchange of information on defence planning. For the
transmission of information on agreed measures, a communication network was set
up for direct communications between the capitals of the participating states.428
          The second basket was about cooperation in a number of other fields including
economics, science, technology, and the environment. The participating states agreed
to promote trade, the exchange of economic and commercial information and
industrial cooperation; to improve opportunities for the exchange and dissemination
of scientific information; and to take the necessary measures to bring together
environmental policies.429
          The OSCE is not an economic organization. Nonetheless, as a part of its
comprehensive approach to security, it addresses economic and environmental
issues. It is expected that economic and environmental solidarity and cooperation can
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contribute to peace and stability; economic and environmental problems can
contribute to increasing tensions within or among states.430
          The economic dimension of the OSCE involves monitoring of economic and
environmental developments among participating states to detect any threat of
conflict; and to facilitate the formulation of economic and environmental policies
promoting security in the OSCE area. The OSCE organizes conferences and
seminars on economic and environmental matters; promotes adherence to shared
standards and norms for economic and environmental behaviour and maintains
contacts with other international organizations. Its main instruments are Coordinator
of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities and the Economic Forum as well
as an annual Senior Council meeting on the transition to free market economies.431
          The term “Human Dimension” refers to the commitments made by OSCE
participating states to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
to abide by the rule of law, to promote the principles of democracy and, in this
regard, to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as to promote
tolerance throughout the OSCE area.432
          In the third basket, the participating states expressed their conviction that
“increased cultural and educational exchange, broader dissemination of information,
contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will all
contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples.” In order
to achieve this goal, 25 specific standards were formulated, on a wide range of
subjects including family reunification, freedom of travel, improvement of conditions
for tourism, access to and exchange of information and increased cooperation in the
fields of culture and education. This was one of the major achievements of the
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Helsinki Process. Human rights and fundamental freedoms had never before been the
subject of direct East- West talks.433
          Since 1990 the OSCE has developed institutions and mechanisms to promote
respect for the commitments, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHIR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the
Representatives on Freedom of the Media and the Missions and other field
presences.434
          In November 1999, at the Istanbul Summit, the OSCE Heads of State and
Government signed the Charter for European Security, in order to define better role
of the OSCE. The Charter aimed at strengthening the Organization’s ability to
prevent conflicts, to settle them and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and
destruction.435
          The OSCE today occupies a unique in the place of world of international
organizations in general and in the realm of European security institutions in
particular. This stems from its broad membership, comprehensive approach to
security, conflict prevention instruments, tradition of open dialogue and consensus
building, shared norms and values among its participating states, and well-developed
patterns of contacts and cooperation with other organizations and institutions. The
basic priorities of the OSCE at the present are:
• to consolidate the participating states’ common values and held in building fully
democratic civil societies based on the rule of law;
• to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war torn areas;
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• to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new
political, economic or social divisions by promoting a cooperative system of
security.436
4.2. The Helsinki Process and its Contribution to the End of the Cold
War
          The CSCE process was one of the main catalysts that fostered security and
cooperation in Europe and overcome the ideological division of Europe in the 1970s
and 1980s and brought about the end of the Cold war.437
          The CBMs in the East-West conflict performed a specific function of reducing
the likelihood of the perceived threat of a surprise attack. They focused on
information, notification, communication, access and constraint measures. Within the
CSCE the CBMs initiated a process of negotiation and consultations on sensitive
military matters with the active participation of high level military officers.438 In
particular the third basket played a complementary role. As a result, the Helsinki
process played an important role in ending the Cold war.439
4.3. OSCE and the Mediterranean
          From the beginning of the Helsinki Process, the CSCE commenced a special
relationship with a number of countries from the southern rim of the Mediterranean
linking European security with that of the Mediterranean.440 Due to the geographical
proximity, as well as historical, cultural, economic and political ties of OSCE
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countries with the Mediterranean region, a chapter on “Questions relating to security
and cooperation in the Mediterranean” was included in the Helsinki Final Act
(1975).441
          In it the participating states stated their conviction that “security in Europe is to
be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with
security in the Mediterranean as a whole and that accordingly the process of
improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts
of world and in particular the Mediterranean area”442.
          Further they noted the interest expressed by the non-participating states in the
Conference since its inception and declared their intention to promote the
development of good-neighbourly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean
states, to increase mutual confidence, to increase so as to promote security and
stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole. The participating states also declared
their intention to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean states the
development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the various fields of economic
activity. Cooperation in the fields of industry, science, technology and environment
was also emphasized.443
          The participating states also declared their intention of maintaining and
amplifying the contacts and dialogue with the purpose of contributing to peace,
reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the
region and widening the scope of cooperation.444
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          In the follow up meetings after Helsinki, the Mediterranean states were invited
to make written and oral contributions. Between 1975 and 1994, specific meetings
were held on Mediterranean issues, mostly relating to the economic, environmental,
scientific and cultural issues, in addition to practical ways of cooperation between the
Mediterranean states and the CSCE. These took place in Valletta in 1979; in Venice
in 1984, in Palma de Mallorca in 1990 and in Valletta in 1993.445
          In the 1990 Charter of Paris, the participating states maintained that they “will
continue efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean as an
important factor for stability in Europe.”
          A process of structuring relations began in 1992, with the Helsinki Document
1992 opening the way for participation of the Mediterranean states in CSCE Review
Conferences. At the 25th Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting in Prague in
1994, after examining requests from the five non-participating states (Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Morocco and Tunisia), the participating states decided to invite the
Mediterranean countries to a series of CSCE activities in order to forge a closer
relationship. Thus the non-participating states were invited to Council of Ministers
meetings, review conferences, regular meetings with the Troika and on a case-by-
case, to seminars and other ad hoc meetings in which they had a special interest. The
Mediterranean states were given access to all CSCE documents and the right to
submit views to Chairmen-in-Office.446
          In December 1994 at the landmark Budapest Summit of the CSCE – which
was renamed the OSCE- decisions were taken to enhance the dialogue with the
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Mediterranean.447 Italy, Spain and France were the main advocates of an enhanced
relation with the Mediterranean.448
          The OSCE participating states were to establish an “informal open-ended
contact group at the level of experts within the framework of the OSCE Permanent
Council in Vienna. This group would meet periodically with representatives of the
non-participating Mediterranean states to conduct a dialogue and facilitate the
exchange of information.449
          This new framework for cooperation was established in order to intensify
dialogue with the Mediterranean states, and also foresaw the organization of
Mediterranean Seminars on topics of mutual interest, as well as high level
consultations between the OSCE, represented by the Troika and the Secretary
General and the Mediterranean partners.450
          To avoid the negative connotation of “Non-Participating Mediterranean
States”, the Permanent Council adopted a decision on 5 December 1995 which
renamed them “Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation” (MPCs).451
          Although the meetings of the Contact Group with the Mediterranean partners
for copeeration are informal, a number of participating states, including the MPCs,
are represented at ambassadorial level and all six MPCs regularly attend its meetings.
The agenda of the Contact Group meetings with the MPCs includes a briefing by a
representative of the Chairmen-in-Office with information on most recent events, in
particular OSCE missions and field activities. This is followed by a presentation by
an OSCE official on one of the main aspects of the OSCE’s activity, such as by the
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Representative on Freedom of Media, the coordinator of OSCE Economic and
Environmental activities or a Personal Representative of the Chairmen-in-Office. 452
          As part of the OSCE effort a seminar was organized in Cairo in 1995 on
OSCE’s experience in the field of confidence building measures. This seminar was
followed by other seminars: In 1996, in Tel Aviv “The OSCE as a Platform for
Dialogue and the Fostering of Norms of Beahaviour”; in 1997, in Cairo “The
Security Model for the 21ST Century: Implications for the Mediterranean Basin”; in
1998, in Malta “The Human Dimension of Security Promoting Democracy and the
rule of Law”; in Amman, in 1999 “Implementation of Human Dimension
Commitments”; in Portoro, in 2000 “The Confidence-Building Measures and
Confidence- and Security- Building Mesaures: The OSCE Experience and its
Relevance for the Mediterranean Region.”
          The MPCs are also invited to attend relevant meetings in all the three
dimensions of the OSCE. They attend the annual meetings of the Economic Forum
held in Prague, which reviews the implementation of commitments undertaken in
Economic Dimension. They participate in the Human Dimension Implementation
Meetings and the supplementary Human Dimension Meetings. Parliamentarians of
the MPCs are also invited to a number of events organized by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the OSCE, such as the Annual Sessions and other meetings.453
          On June 1998, the Permanent Council adopted a decision providing for
representatives of the MPCs to form a part of an OSCE/ODIHIR election observation
team. The MPCs have been encouraged to take advantage of this decision by actively
participating in and thus benefiting from the experience of the OSCE in the field.454
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          In the Declaration of the Istanbul Summit, in November 1999, the
interdependence between seurity in Europe and the Mediterranean was once more
underscored. This document stated that: “In the light of our relationship with our
Mediterranean Partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, we
reaffirm that strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area is of
major importance to the stability in the OSCE area. We therefore intend to enhance
our dialogue and joint activities with them.”455
          Little was achieved in transferring the experience and knowledge of traditional
CBMs where the OSCE has much expertise. Indeed, OSCE has not attempted to
make use of the CSCE/OSCE experience in Europe and apply it to the
Mediterranean.456 A number of participating states argues that the OSCE experience,
both in military and non-military aspects of confidence building could be applicable
to the Mediterranean region.457
          Most Arab analysts reject the introduction of military confidence building
measures under conditions of disequilibrium and territorial annexation. They argue
that CBMs are a status-quo oriented concept.458 The resolution of issues relating to
the Arab-Israeli dispute is a prerequisite for the confidence building process. And
also, as long as Israel has nuclear monopoly, there will be no basis for a genuine
Arab-Israeli confidence building and peace.459
          They are particularly suspicious of military transparency, which are perceived
as instruments to gain intelligence and unilateral advantage. Thus, they oppose the
idea of providing a potential adversary with detailed information on their military
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capability. Equally, Americans, Europeans and Israelis already have access to
information on military capability through satellites and technical intelligence.460
          The Arab states argue that the East-West model of confidence building was
successful because three conditions were realised:
• the participating states agreed to respect present borders resulting from the
Second World War;
• there was a balance of military forces between NATO and the Warsaw pact;
• there was no military conflict among Europeans.
These conditions do not exist in the Mediterranean. Hence insecurity in the
Mediterranean can not be managed by simply transferring the CSCE model of
military CBMs to the Mediterranean.461 The Arab analysts believe in that political
conditions prevailing in the region may allow for the institution of CBMs intended to
improve political, economic and cultural relations than CBMs basically related to
military aspects of inter-state relations.462 A number of experts consider the
possibility of introducing traditional CBMs in the Mediterranean currently as
unrealistic. Regional players indicate that “the absence of a comprehensive, just and
lasting peace precludes parties in the region from applying the progressive CBMs
that have proved effective in the framework of the OSCE.463
          Over the years, however, while dialogue moved ahead, concrete action has
been slow in coming. Due to the political developments of 1989, the CSCE largely
concentrated on Europe, rather than on the Mediterranean.464 Although the MPCs
empahsized that bridging economic and technological differences and reducing
disparities and containing the dangers of environmental pollution between the two
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regions are needed for the stability in the Mediterranean region, the OSCE has
limited means to react to these concerns.465 It seems that priorities of the OSCE lie
elsewhere. In its web page there are links to the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe
and even in central Asia and Caucasus, but not the Mediterranean. However the
OSCE dialogue can contribute to increasing relations between north and the south.
The OSCE Mediterranean Seminars provide a dialogue opportunity not only to the
OSCE officials and the MPCs, but also to the EU, NATO, WEU, UN officials and
civil societies to discuss the Mediterranean issues. In this respect it can fill an
important gap and enable the participants to coordinate their actions and share their
experiences on their own dialogues.
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CONCLUSIONS
           The end of the Cold War created an optimistic atmosphere in Europe. It was
expected that the new era would create an opportunity for cooperation among the
former enemies and that would cause more security and stability in Europe. But,
unfortunately, this optimism has not lasted for a long time. Security and stability
were achieved, to some extent, in the Central and Eastern Europe, but the Gulf
Crisis, the Algerian case and the turmoil in the Balkans have shown that Europe was
not secure at all.
          These events forced the western analysts, institutions and policy makers to
contemplate on the security challenges of the new era, which mostly stem from the
Mediterranean region, once more. The security challenges are not only military
issues but also non-military matters. They are transnational and interdependent.
Hence comprehensive approach to security is necessary.
          The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means, even though it is not a
direct threat at the moment for Europe, because of its possible indirect implications,
is one of the concerns. The increasing energy dependency of the European countries
to the region is another serious matter. Terrorism, drug trafficking, organizational
crime; the increasing economic gap between the North and the South; the increasing
population, the high unemployment rates, political instability, strengthening
fundamentalism and radical Islam, environmental problems etc. in the region are
some of the others. To deal with these challenges some of the western institutions
started initiatives towards the region.
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          As a result of the end of the Cold War, the Arab countries have significantly
lost strategic weight in the eyes of the former superpowers. They were not able to
exploit the East-West tension any more. Their economies were deteriorating day by
day which meant social unrest at home. As a result of this the public questioned the
legitimacy of the undemocratic leaders. The governors were not able to tackle with
the domestic as well as regional problems. The fortunate 1991 Madrid Agreement
and the 1993 Oslo Accords paved the way for a cooperation with the rich northern
neighbours and they acted in this way.
          In this regard, in 1995 NATO started a dialogue with five of the Mediterranean
states. Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Later on Jordan and Algeria
participated in. The dialogue consists of political dialogue and participation in
specific activities. The purpose of the NATO Mediterranean Initiative is to achieve
better mutual understanding with the countries to the south and to contribute to the
strengthening of stability in the Mediterranean region by making the Alliance’s aims
and objectives better understood. But the US led military nature of the organization,
in addition to lack of will and coherence among the member states, lack of solid
goals and funds make its future highly questionable. The Arab countries look at the
dialogue as a tool that can be useful in increasing relations with the rich northern
states.
          The most ambitious institutional initiative, which copies the CSCE/CSCM
method466, was initiated by the EU with the twelve Mediterranean partners in 1995.
The main aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to promote long term
stability through economic development. Economic development is assumed to have
spillovers in political, social and security terms by providing more opportunities for
jobs at home (thus easing migratory pressures), raising the standards of living, and
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decreasing the attractiveness of extremist ideologies. The initiative is designed to
promote an integrated economic area that fosters closer cooperation on political,
social and economic issues. The most noteworthy aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership is its long-term and comprehensive approach.467 It has the necessary
economic instruments to deal with the root causes of the problems. However, lack of
political will and coherence among the member states slow down the process. For the
EU, like NATO, priorities lie elsewhere: Central and Eastern Europe. There are
serious problems in the Mediterranean region, but not serious enough to waste more
money and time.
          The OSCE also has a Mediterranean Dialogue.  There have been no dramatic
developments in the OSCE-Mediterranean Dialogue since the landmark Budapest
summit in December 1994.468 It seems that the priorities of the OSCE lie elsewhere.
The OSCE tends to put the Mediterranean on the same level of importance as Japan
and South Korea.469 Even though it follows a comprehensive approach to security, it
doesn’t have the necessary means to tackle with the region’s problems.
          Most if not all security problems in the Mediterranean are not military ones but
economic and political in nature.470  As it was admitted by the former NATO
Secretary-General the EU is the key player in the Mediterranean given that most of
the security challenges in the area stem from deteriorating social and economic
conditions. Thus, according to Solana, the EU’s Barcelona Process is the central
multilateral initiative involving in the Mediterranean.471 The advantage of the EU is
paradoxically that it is not a security organization and thus is better qualified to
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tackle the roots of instability that give rise to security concerns, as it is seeking to do
through its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project.472
          Progress in the economic and financial chapter as well as on social, cultural
and human affairs of the Barcelona Process can enable the institutions to advance
more firmly in the military security dialogue to limit the severe North-South
perception of risks and the development of partnership building measures, CBMs and
CSBMs that would allow, not only conflict prevention, but also preparation of the
path for arms control and disarmament in the Mediterranean.473
          NATO and OSCE can only play a complementary role in the region. NATO, in
parallel with the developments in the Barcelona Process can increase the number and
range of practical cooperation which brings together military officials. The OSCE,
because of its good image in the south, can provide a platform for discussing
sensitive issues such as human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of media, what
CBMs mean etc. But, cooperation, rather than competition, is vital for the
effectiveness of the attempts. In this regard, an establishment of a permanent body,
which brings together officials from the institutions and the dialogue countries, can
enhance the progress of the initiatives.
          Institutions can provide peace and stability to the extent that they create
interdependence and serve the interests of all the participants. In the Mediterranean
case, all the attempts reflect northern security concern, rather than seriously
considering the southern interests. This combined with lack of coherence among the
member states, lack of political will and reluctance of wasting more money
diminishes the effectiveness of the institutions. On the other side of the
Mediterranean, the undemocratic character of the regimes, lack of episdemic
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community, insufficient civil society, lack of culture of cooperation, the colonial
memories of the past impede significant progress. Cultural and religious differences
between the both sides of the Mediterranean also cause reluctance for cooperation
among the participants.
          Advances in the Middle East peace process and in south-south cooperation are
indispensable. The murder of Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin and the election of a
successor had frozen the peace process and this overshadowed all North-South trans-
Mediterranean negotiations.474   Until now, none of the initiatives has been able to
affect positively the peace process and will not be able to do so in the near future.
But they all have been vulnerable to the developments in the peace process. The
second Intifada that began on 28 September 2001 worsened the situation. Progress in
the Mediterranean depends on the Middle East Peace Process.475 Only after a real
peace can significant progress be expected from the institutional initiatives.
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